Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology-consequences and norms-are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Whether human evaluative conditioning can occur without contingency awareness has been the subject of an intense and ongoing debate for decades, troubled by a wide array of methodological difficulties. Following recent methodological innovations, the available evidence currently points to the conclusion that evaluative conditioning effects do not occur without contingency awareness. In a simulation, we demonstrate, however, that these innovations are strongly biased toward the conclusion that evaluative conditioning requires contingency awareness, confounding the measurement of contingency memory with conditioned attitudes. We adopt a process-dissociation procedure to separate the memory and attitude components. In 4 studies, the attitude parameter is validated using existing attitudes and applied to probe for contingency-unaware evaluative conditioning. A fifth experiment incorporates a time-delay manipulation confirming the dissociability of the attitude and memory components. The results indicate that evaluative conditioning can produce attitudes without conscious awareness of the contingencies. Implications for theories of evaluative conditioning and associative learning are discussed.

This article provides a comprehensive review of divergent conceptualizations of the “implicit” construct that have emerged in attitude research over the past two decades. In doing so, our goal is to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of conceptual ambiguities associated with this terminology. We identify three main conceptualizations of the “implicitness” construct: the procedural conceptualization (implicit-as-indirect), the functional conceptualization (implicit-as-automatic), and the mental theory conceptualization (implicit-as-associative), as well as two hybrid conceptualizations (implicit-as-indirect-and-automatic, implicit-as-driven-by-affective-gut-reactions). We discuss critical limitations associated with each conceptualization and explain that confusion also arises from their coexistence. We recommend discontinuing the usage of the “implicit” terminology in attitude research and research inspired by it. We offer terminological alternatives aimed at increasing both the precision of theorization and the practical value of future research.

Recent research has shown that evaluative conditioning (EC) procedures can change attitudes without participants' awareness of the contingencies between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012). We present a theoretical explanation and boundary condition for the emergence of unaware EC effects based on the implicit misattribution of evaluative responses from unconditioned to conditioned stimuli. We hypothesize that such misattribution is only possible when conditioned and unconditioned stimuli are perceived simultaneously. Therefore we manipulate the simultaneity of the stimulus presentations and apply a process dissociation procedure to distinguish contingency-aware from contingency-unaware EC effects. A multinomial model indicates that with sequential presentations, EC effects do not occur without contingency awareness. However, unaware EC effects do occur with simultaneous presentations. The findings support dual-process theories of learning.

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