According to contingent-processing accounts, peripheral cuing effects are due to the cues' inadvertent selection for processing by control settings set up for targets (e.g., C. L. Folk, R. W. Remington, & J. C. Johnston, 1992). Consequently, cues similar to targets should have stronger effects than do dissimilar cues. In the current study, this prediction is confirmed for cue-target combinations similar or dissimilar in the static features of color (Experiments 1-3) and location (Experiment 4), even when both cues and targets share the dynamic feature of abrupt onset. Perceptual priming (Experiment 2) and reallocation of attention did not account for similar-dissimilar differences (Experiments 3 and 4). The results are best explained by top-down-contingent attentional effects of the similar cues. Implications for bottom-up accounts of peripheral cuing effects are discussed. ((c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)

Do threatening or negative faces capture attention? The authors argue that evidence from visual search, spatial cuing, and flanker tasks is equivocal and that perceptual differences may account for effects attributed to emotional categories. Empirically, the authors examine the flanker task. Although they replicate previous results in which a positive face flanked by negative faces suffers more interference than a negative face flanked by positive faces, further results indicate that face perception is not necessary for the flanker-effect asymmetry and that the asymmetry also occurs with nonemotional stimuli. The authors conclude that the flanker-effect asymmetry with affective faces cannot be unambiguously attributed to emotional differences and may well be due to purely perceptual differences between the stimuli.

According to the concept of direct parameter specification, nonconsciously registered information can be processed to the extent that it matches currently active intentions of a person. This prediction was tested and confirmed in the current study. Masked visual information provided by peripheral cues led to reaction time (RT) effects only if the information specified one of the required responses (Experiments 1 and 3). Information delivered by the same masked cues that did not match the intentions was not used. However, the same information influenced RT if it was provided by visible cues (Experiments 2 and 3). The results suggest that the processing of nonconsciously registered information is flexible because it is susceptible to the changing intentions of a person. Yet, these processes are apparently restricted, as nonconsciously registered information cannot be used as easily for purposes not corresponding to the currently active intentions as better visible information.

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