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We use the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances to measure the change in federal tax liability that would result should mortgage interest no longer be deductible from taxable income. We argue that the elimination of this housing tax provision would lead households to reshuffle their balance sheet, thereby lowering the amount of interest income taxes collected. We find that the cost of this tax provision is between 36 and 66 percent of the estimates produced by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, depending on the types of assets one assumes would be used to lower mortgage debt following the removal of the provision. Furthermore, since mostly rich households would be in a position to reshuffle their balance sheet following such a change in tax policy, the distributional effect of this program are much smaller than conventionally believed.

Les Programmes de candidats des provinces ont accru le rôle des provinces dans le processus de sélection des immigrants au Canada. Dans cet article, nous comparons, grâce à des données administratives, les revenus et les taux d'établissement des immigrants ayant fait leur demande grâce à un Programme de candidats des provinces (CP) et ceux des immigrants ayant utilisé un programme fédéral comparable, comme la catégorie de l'immigration économique (IE). Nos résultats montrent que les CP ont un revenu plus élevé dès leur arrivée, mais que, par la suite, l'augmentation de leurs revenus est plus faible. De plus, alors que les différences sur le plan des caractéristiques observables des deux types d'immigrants n'ont qu'un effet négligeable sur les revenus à l'arrivée, elles ont un effet plus important sur l'augmentation des revenus par la suite. Par ailleurs, les CP sont plus susceptibles que les IE de rester dans la province où ils se sont d'abord installés, et les différences sur le plan des caractéristiques observables des deux types d'immigrants expliquent dans la plupart des cas les taux d'établissement plus élevés des CP. Mots clés : Programme de candidats des provinces, revenu, taux d'établissementProvincial Nominee programs have increased the role of the provinces in selecting immigrants to Canada. We use administrative data to compare the earnings and settlement rates of Provincial Nominees (PNs) and immigrants through comparable federal programs, such as economic class immigrants (ECIs). We find that PNs experienced higher entry earnings, but slower subsequent earnings growth. While differences in observable characteristics of immigrants through the two programs played a nominal role in accounting for differences in entry earnings, they were more important in accounting for differences in subsequent earnings growth. Further, we find that PNs were more likely than ECIs to stay in the province to which they were initially destined, and that differences in observable characteristics account for most of the higher settlement rate of PNs.

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