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We investigate whether individuals are more prone to act selfishly if they can passively allow for an outcome to be implemented (omission) rather than having to make an active choice (commission). In most settings, active and passive choice alternatives differ in terms of factors such as the presence of a suggested option, costs of taking an action, and awareness. We isolate the omission effect from confounding factors in three experiments, and find no evidence that the distinction between active and passive choices has an independent effect on the propensity to implement selfish outcomes. This suggests that increased selfishness through omission, as observed in various economic choice situations, is driven by other factors than a preference for selfish omissions.

Players often fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium in laboratory weak-link coordination games. In this paper, we investigate whether such coordination failures can be mitigated by increasing the number of rounds or altering per-period stakes. We find that neither time horizon nor stakes affect equilibrium selection. In contrast to previous findings, players are not more likely to play above the previous period’s minimum choice when the horizon is longer or per-period stakes lower. We also investigate which socio-demographic factors and behavioral traits correlate most strongly with play both in the first round and in subsequent rounds. Cognitive ability as measured by a cognitive reflection test stands out as the characteristic that is most strongly associated with efficient coordination.