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Purpose: This study aims to examine the effect of several factors on auditor change in the insurance industry in Jordan. Design/Methodology/Approach: A discretionary change of an external auditor is the change that takes place before the end of the maximum allowed auditor tenure period (4-year in Jordan). The study sample comprises all Jordanian insurance companies with complete data for the period (2014)(2015)(2016)(2017)(2018). Using a logistic regression model to test the hypotheses, the study results revealed that modified audit opinion and change in a firm's management significantly affect discretionary auditor change, while firm growth has a significant negative effect. Findings: The study recommends that the Jordanian Securities Commission issue instructions that prevent the firm new management from changing the auditor unnecessarily to work with a particular one with whom might have a relationship. Practical Implications: The study claimed that due to the threat of discretionary change, the lack of auditor independence may lead to biased reports that may involve incorrect information and materially misstated financial statements that cover problems facing the firm and thus harm the company, industry, and the economy at large. Originality/Value: The study incurs additional costs and time to select a new auditor and suffers the loss of experience and knowledge developed by the previous one, which may raise questions about the entity's policy. Therefore, it is important to consider the solution proposed by this study.

The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between some Corporate Governance indicators and the probability of modifying the independent auditor opinion in the Jordanian market. The sample consists of 104 non-financial firms listed on Amman stock Exchange for the year 2015. The logistic regression via SPSS is used to analyze the data. The results show that firm’s profitability (measured by ROA) and the number of institutional investors on the board of directors are significant negative predictors of the probability of receiving modified audit opinion by the firm. That is the higher the firm’s ROA and the larger number institutional investor representatives on the board of directors the less likely the firm will receive a modified audit opinion. On the other hand, the results also show that the board of directors’ size is significant positive predictor of receiving a modified audit opinion by the firm. That is the larger the size of the board of directors the more likely the firm will receive a modified audit opinion. Although, it is an unexpected result it agrees with some other studies results. Finally, board independence, board activity and the presence of audit committee have no significant impact on the type of audit opinion the firm receives.

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