Perception and action are governed not only by sensory information but also by prior predictions about sensory events. These sensory predictions allow one to react more rapidly to predictable information in the environment and to perceptually distinguish self-produced and externally produced sensations. In order to be accurate, however, all sensory predictions need continuous recalibration to match the changing properties of the environment, the sensorimotor system, or both. Earlier studies showed that the cerebellum is crucial for the recalibration of sensory predictions capturing the sensory consequences of one's motor behavior. Here we asked whether the cerebellum, a structure intimately linked to plasticity within the motor domain, also accounts for the recalibration of sensory predictions about external sensory events within the perceptual domain in a nonmotor task. Cerebellar patients and healthy controls were equally able to predict the time of reappearance of a moving target that temporarily disappeared behind an occluder. However, patients were significantly impaired in recalibrating this spatiotemporal prediction to account for an experimentally added delay. This suggests that the cerebellum plays a domain-general role in fine tuning predictive models.

No abstract

Delusions of control in schizophrenia are characterized by the striking feeling that one’s actions are controlled by external forces. We here tested qualitative predictions inspired by Bayesian causal inference models, which suggest that such misattributions of agency should lead to decreased intentional binding. Intentional binding refers to the phenomenon that subjects perceive a compression of time between their intentional actions and consequent sensory events. We demonstrate that patients with delusions of control perceived less self-agency in our intentional binding task. This effect was accompanied by significant reductions of intentional binding as compared to healthy controls and patients without delusions. Furthermore, the strength of delusions of control tightly correlated with decreases in intentional binding. Our study validated a critical prediction of Bayesian accounts of intentional binding, namely that a pathological reduction of the prior likelihood of a causal relation between one’s actions and consequent sensory events—here captured by delusions of control—should lead to lesser intentional binding. Moreover, our study highlights the import of an intact perception of temporal contiguity between actions and their effects for the sense of agency.