Men's rape myth acceptance (RMA; prejudiced beliefs that serve to exonerate the rapist and blame the victim) has been shown to correlate positively with self‐reported rape proclivity (RP). To explore the causal pathway underlying this correlation, two experiments were conducted in which the relative cognitive accessibility of RMA and RP was varied. Male students were asked to report their RP in the context of a scale assessing attraction toward sexual aggression (Experiment 1) or in response to five realistic date‐rape scenarios (Experiment 2), either before or after they filled out a 20‐item RMA scale. In both studies, the correlation of RMA and RP was significantly greater in the after than in the before condition, suggesting that the belief in rape myths has a causal influence on men's proclivity to rape. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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The capacity to identify cheaters is essential for maintaining balanced social relationships, yet humans have been shown to be generally poor deception detectors. In fact, a plethora of empirical findings holds that individuals are only slightly better than chance when discerning lies from truths. Here, we report 5 experiments showing that judges' ability to detect deception greatly increases after periods of unconscious processing. Specifically, judges who were kept from consciously deliberating outperformed judges who were encouraged to do so or who made a decision immediately; moreover, unconscious thinkers' detection accuracy was significantly above chance level. The reported experiments further show that this improvement comes about because unconscious thinking processes allow for integrating the particularly rich information basis necessary for accurate lie detection. These findings suggest that the human mind is not unfit to distinguish between truth and deception but that this ability resides in previously overlooked processes.

In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the influence of situational familiarity with the judgmental context on the process of lie detection. They predicted that high familiarity with a situation leads to a more pronounced use of content cues when making judgments of veracity. Therefore, they expected higher classification accuracy of truths and lies under high familiarity. Under low situational familiarity, they expected that people achieve lower accuracy rates because they use more nonverbal cues for their veracity judgments. In all 4 experiments, participants with high situational familiarity achieved higher accuracy rates in classifying both truthful and deceptive messages than participants with low situational familiarity. Moreover, mediational analyses demonstrated that higher classification accuracy in the high-familiarity condition was associated with more use of verbal content cues and less use of nonverbal cues.

Four experiments investigated the influence of Need for Cognition on the process of lie detection. According to the basic assumptions of dual process models, only higher Need for Cognition leads to the use of verbal information when making judgments of veracity. People with lower Need for Cognition predominantly use stereotypical nonverbal information for their judgments. In both Experiments 1 and 2, participants saw a film in which nonverbal cues (fidgety vs. calm movements) and verbal cues (low vs. high plausibility) were manipulated. As predicted, when Need for Cognition was lower, only the nonverbal cues influenced participants' judgments of veracity. In contrast, participants with higher Need for Cognition also used the verbal cues. Experiments 3 and 4 tested the hypothesis that higher Need for Cognition leads to better discrimination of truthful from deceptive messages. Both experiments found that participants with higher Need for Cognition achieved higher accuracy at classifying truthful and deceptive messages than participants with lower Need for Cognition.Keywords: credibility attribution, lie detection, need for cognition, detection of deception, lay judgment A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT Running head: NEED FOR COGNITION AND THE PROCESS OF LIE DETECTION 3 Need for Cognition and the Process of Lie DetectionIn a recent comprehensive meta-analysis of more than 200 studies, Bond and DePaulo (2006) found that people without special training achieved an accuracy rate of 54% when judging the veracity of true or invented statements. People overall were better at correctly rating truths as nondeceptive (61%) than lies as deceptive (47%). These general results were in line with previous (meta-analytic) reviews that reported accuracy rates in the range of 45 to 60%