In an analysis of the French episode of heat wave in 2003, this article highlights how heat wave dangers result from the intricate association of natural and social factors. Unusually high temperatures, as well as socioeconomic vulnerability, along with social attenuation of hazards, in a general context where the anthropogenic contribution to climate change is becoming more plausible, led to an excess of 14,947 deaths in France, between August 4 and 18, 2003. The greatest increase in mortality was due to causes directly attributable to heat: dehydration, hyperthermia, heat stroke. In addition to age and gender, combinatorial factors included preexisting disease, medication, urban residence, isolation, poverty, and, probably, air pollution. Although diversely impacted or reported, many parts of Europe suffered human and other losses, such as farming and forestry through drought and fires. Summer 2003 was the hottest in Europe since 1500, very likely due in part to anthropogenic climate change. The French experience confirms research establishing that heat waves are a major mortal risk, number one among so-called natural hazards in postindustrial societies. Yet France had no policy in place, as if dangerous climate were restricted to a distant or uncertain future of climate change, or to preindustrial countries. We analyze the heat wave's profile as a strongly attenuated risk in the French context, as well as the causes and the effects of its sudden shift into amplification. Research and preparedness needs are highlighted.

The role carbon emissions play in contributing to climate change makes clear the necessity for a global reconsideration of current modes of energy production. In recent years, as concerns over the threats of climate change (CC) have become more acute, four technologies have notably risen to the forefront of academic and public discourse: nuclear power, carbon capture and storage (CCS), wind power, and geoengineering. The particular interest of these four approaches lies in the fact that they reflect both energy production and climate control technologies, are often socially controversial, and present complex challenges of governance. Nuclear and wind power both deserve an important place among the variety of low‐carbon energy options. In countries where public acceptance is evaluated, although, support for nuclear energy appears to be conditional upon simultaneous development of other renewable energies alongside a feasible plan to address the disposal of nuclear waste. The Fukushima accident sharply increased public concern about the safety and vulnerability of nuclear reactors. While wind power receives general public support, issues of accommodation can arise when it comes to siting wind farms. Persistent dependency upon carbon‐producing energy has made favorable the option of CCS. However, in addition to technical and geological factors, social resistance to the placement of carbon storage units remains a key obstacle. Geoengineering offers the technological capacity to directly act on the climate should levels of atmospheric CO2 become dangerously high. Public perception regarding the risk of climate change can be labile, and the alternatives reviewed here share the characteristic that their technical and political dimensions are intertwined. The variety of options for combining and implementing these technologies, coupled with the inherently time‐sensitive nature of CC, underscore the complexity of the endeavor. In order to bridge these various levels of analysis and decision making, and to better understand and integrate people's involvement, exercises in risk governance could be developed at both the national and international levels. WIREs Clim Change 2011 2 712–727 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.134This article is categorized under: Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Social Amplification/Attenuation of Climate Risks The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior

No abstract

Efficiency targets proposed as part of international commitments to reduce CO2 emissions include future changes in individual patterns of energy consumption. This goal is presently being addressed in France through the installation of smart meters. Considering that public resistance or blatant opposition could jeopardize the grid modernization in the whole country, this study focused on the responses of groups of citizens from the two French communities where the new meters were first installed: Château-Renault (rural) and Lyon (urban). This study used the method of reconvened focus groups to inform policymakers about the reasoning of citizens in this situation. The discussions and the material generated by the groups provided very concrete elements on how the participants tried to make sense of the meter device itself and the policy goals, in relation to their daily and social life. The exchanges between participants seemed to fit into three main dialogical pairs, or themata: collective vs. individual (daily life); private (my behaviour) vs. public spheres (others' behaviours); and consumption: individualist vs. collectivist. The collective elaboration throughout the group sessions reinforced the empowerment of the groups and led to considering more collectively-oriented approaches in contrast to the prevailing individualistic lifestyles.

Risk policy and public attitudes appear disconnected from research predicting warmer climate partially due to human activity. To step out of this stalled situation, a worst case scenario of a 5-to 6-m sea level rise (SLR) induced by the collapse of the WAIS and occurring during the period 2030-2130 is constructed and applied to the Rhone delta. Physical and socio-economic scenarios developed with data from the Rhone delta context are developed and submitted to stakeholders for a day-long workshop. Group process analysis shows a high level of trust and cooperation mobilized to face the 5-6 m SLR issue, despite potentially diverging interests. Two sets of recommendations stem from the scenario workshop. A conservative "wait and see" option is decided when the risk of the WAIS collapse is announced in 2030. After WAIS collapse generates an effective 1 m SLR rise by 2050, decisions are taken for total retreat and rendering of the Rhone delta to its hydrological function. The transposition of these results into present-day policy decisions could be considered. The methodology developed here could be applied to other risk objects and situations, and serve for policy exercises and crisis prevention.