Experienced events consist of several elements which need to be bound together in memory to represent the event in a coherent manner. Given such bindings, the retrieval of one event element should be related to the successful retrieval of another element of the same event, thus leading to a stochastic dependency of the retrieval of event elements. The way in which bindings are structured is not yet clearly established and only few moderators of the binding of event elements have been identified. We present results from three experiments aiming to distinguish between an integrated binding structure, in which event elements are bound into a unitary representation, and a hierarchical binding structure, in which event elements are preferentially bound to specific types of elements. Experiments 2 and 3 were additionally designed to identify animacy, an entity's property of being alive, as a potential moderator of the binding of event elements. We also offer a new approach for modelling dependencies of the retrieval of event elements which mitigates some limitations of previous approaches. Consistent with previous literature we found dependencies of the retrieval of event elements if all of an events' constituent associations were shown. We found mixed evidence for integrated or hierarchical binding structures but found dependency of the retrieval of event elements to be sensitive to the presence of animacy in an event. The results suggest that binding structures may vary depending on moderators such as animacy or event structure awareness. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are discussed.

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Remembering an experienced event in a coherent manner requires the binding of the event’s constituent elements. Such binding effects manifest as a stochastic dependency of the retrieval of event elements. Several approaches for modeling these dependencies have been proposed. We compare the contingency-based approach by Horner & Burgess (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 1370–1383, 2013), related approaches using Yule’s Q (Yule, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 75(6), 579–652, 1912) or an adjusted Yule’s Q (c.f. Horner & Burgess, Current Biology, 24(9), 988–992, 2014), an approach based on item response theory (IRT, Schreiner et al., in press), and a nonparametric variant of the IRT-based approach. We present evidence from a simulation study comparing the five approaches regarding their empirical detection rates and susceptibility to different levels of memory performance, and from an empirical application. We found the IRT-based approach and its nonparametric variant to yield the highest power for detecting dependencies or differences in dependency between conditions. However, the nonparametric variant yielded increasing Type I error rates with increasing dependency in the data when testing for differences in dependency. We found the approaches based on Yule’s Q to yield biased estimates and to be strongly affected by memory performance. The other measures were unbiased given no dependency or differences in dependency but were also affected by memory performance if there was dependency in the data or if there were differences in dependency, but to a smaller extent. The results suggest that the IRT-based approach is best suited for measuring binding effects. Further considerations when deciding for a modeling approach are discussed.

In cultures with left-right-script, agentic behavior is mentally represented as following a left-to-right trajectory, an effect referred to as the Spatial Agency Bias (SAB, Suitner and Maass, 2016). In this research, we investigated whether spatial representations of activities are universal across activities by analyzing the opposite concepts of “attack” and “defense”. Both behaviors involve similar actions (e.g., fighting) but may differ in perceived agency. Moreover “defense” is necessarily always a response to an attack and may therefore be represented by a trajectory in the opposite direction. Two studies found the classic SAB for activities representing attacking but a reduction (Study 1) and reversal (Study 2) for activities involving defense. Although the spatial representation of defense on the right was much weaker and less unequivocal than that of attack on the left, the results suggest that the spatial representations of defense and attack are located in different positions. Apparently not all actors and all activities are spatially represented on the left with a left-to-right trajectory but position and direction depend on the perceived agency. Directions for future research and applications of our findings are discussed.

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