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An experimental design using treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism is used to test household efficiency. Efficiency is decisively rejected in all treatments contrary to the assumption of most household models. Information on initial endowments of spouses improves efficiency only in some treatments suggesting that the impact of information is context dependent. Actual and expected contribution rates of spouses are systematically different; husbands' (wives') expectations of their wives' (husbands') contributions are higher (lower) than actual contributions. These errors imply that equilibrium in a game theoretic framework is unlikely. Statistical tests indicate other considerations than efficiency are likely important.

We elicit individual preferences over social risk. We identify the extent to which these preferences are correlated with individual preferences over individual risk and individual preferences over the well-being of others. We examine these preferences in the context of laboratory experiments over small, anonymous groups, although the methodological issues extend to larger groups that form endogenously (e.g., families, committees, communities). We find that social risk attitudes can be closely approximated by individual risk attitudes. We find no evidence that subjects systematically reveal different risk attitudes in a social setting compared to when they solely bear the consequences individually.

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