Stimuli that resemble the content of visual working memory (VWM) capture attention. However, theories disagree on how many VWM items can bias attention simultaneously. According to some theories, there is a distinction between active and passive states in VWM, such that only items held in an active state can bias attention. The single-item-template hypothesis holds that only one item can be in an active state and thus can bias attention. In contrast, the multiple-item-template hypothesis posits that multiple VWM items can be in an activate state simultaneously, and thus can bias attention. Recently, Van Moorselaar, Theeuwes, and Olivers (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 40(4):1450, 2014) and Hollingworth and Beck (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 42(7):911–917, 2016) tested these accounts, but obtained seemingly contradictory results. Van Moorselaar et al. (2014) found that a distractor in a visual-search task captured attention more when it matched the content of VWM (memory-driven capture). Crucially, memory-driven capture disappeared when more than one item was held in VWM, in line with the single-item-template hypothesis. In contrast, Hollingworth and Beck (2016) found memory-driven capture even when multiple items were kept in VWM, in line with the multiple-item-template hypothesis. Considering these mixed results, we replicated both studies with a larger sample, and found that all key results are reliable. It is unclear to what extent these divergent results are due to paradigm differences between the studies. We conclude that is crucial to our understanding of VWM to determine the boundary conditions under which memory-driven capture occurs.

Recent work suggests that dishonesty results from ethical blind spots: people’s lack of attention to ethical information. In two experiments (one pre-registered) we used eye tracking to investigate when ethical blind spots emerge, and whether they can be reduced through a simple, non-invasive intervention. Participants reported a Target Digit indicated by a jittery cue that was slightly biased in the direction of another digit (the Second-Cued Digit), which could be either higher or lower than the Target Digit. Participants were paid more for reporting higher digits, and were not penalized for making mistakes, thus providing an incentive to cheat. Results showed that participants frequently made self-serving (and rarely self-hurting) mistakes by reporting the Second-Cued Digit when it was more valuable than the target. Importantly, they rapidly gazed at the digit that they would later report, regardless of whether this report was correct or a self-serving mistake. Finally, we were able to reduce or increase the number of self-serving mistakes by respectively increasing or reducing the visual saliency of the Target Digit. We suggest that increasing the visual saliency of morally desirable options is a promising cost-effective tool to curb dishonesty.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.3758/s13423-019-01638-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Stimuli that resemble the content of visual working memory (VWM) capture attention. However, theories disagree on how many VWM items can bias attention simultaneously. The multiple-state account posits a distinction between template and accessory VWM items, such that only a single template item biases attention. In contrast, homogenous-state accounts posit that all VWM items bias attention. Recently, Van Moorselaar et al. (2014) and Hollingworth and Beck (2016) tested these accounts, but obtained seemingly contradictory results. Van Moorselaar et al. (2014) found that a distractor in a visual-search task captured attention more when it matched the content of VWM (memory-driven capture). Crucially, memory-driven capture disappeared when more than one item was held in VWM, in line with the multiple-state account. In contrast, Hollingworth and Beck (2016) found memory-driven capture even when multiple items were kept in VWM, in line with a homogenous-state account. Considering these mixed results, we replicated both studies with a larger sample, and found that all key results are reliable. It is unclear to what extent these divergent results are due to paradigm differences between the studies. We conclude that is crucial to our understanding of VWM to determine the boundary conditions under which memory-driven capture occurs.

This study shows that participants tend to remember an ambiguous, directional cue as biased towards stimuli associated with a high reward that can be attained dishonestly. Participants saw eight digits presented in a circular arrangement. On some trials, they were asked to report the digit (“Target Digit”) indicated by a jittery cue that was slightly biased in the direction of another digit (“Second Cued Digit”), which was either higher or lower than the Target Digit. Participants were paid based on the reported digit (higher digits meant higher pay) and not based on the accuracy of their report. In this setting, they could make self-serving mistakes by dishonestly reporting the Second Cued Digit when it was higher than the Target Digit. Replicating prior work, participants frequently made such self-serving mistakes. On other trials, after the digits disappeared, participants were asked to reproduce the direction of the jittery cue, without receiving any pay. Results showed that that participants’ reports of the cue were more biased toward high-rewarding digits than low-rewarding digits. This research provides preliminary evidence of a link between attention, dishonesty, and memory, offering an important constraint for theories in behavioral ethics.

Here we report that participants’ visual working memory of an ambiguous cue is biased towards stimuli that are associated with a high reward. Participants saw eight digits presented in a circular arrangement. On some trials, they were asked to report the digit (“Target Digit”) indicated by a jittery cue that was slightly biased in the direction of another digit (“Second Cued Digit”), which was either higher, or lower than the Target Digit. Participants were paid based on the reported digit (higher digits meant higher pay) and not based on the accuracy of their report. In this setting, they could make self-serving mistakes by dishonestly reporting the Second Cued Digit when it was higher than the Target Digit. Replicating prior work, we found that participants frequently made such self-serving mistakes. On other trials, after the digits disappeared, participants were asked to reproduce the direction of the jittery cue, without receiving any pay. This allowed us to test whether participants’ memory of the cue was biased toward high-rewarding digits, and our results showed that it was. We cautiously suggest that self-serving mistakes might result from automatic biases in working memory, which provides an important constraint for theories in behavioral ethics