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We analyze a family of extensive-form solution procedures for games with incomplete information that do not require the specification of an epistemic type space a la Harsanyi, but can accommodate a (commonly known) collection of explicit restrictions D on first-order beliefs. For any fixed D we obtain a solution called D-rationalizability.In static games, D-rationalizability characterizes the set of outcomes (combinations of payoff types and strategies) that may occur in any Bayesian equilibrium model consistent with D; these are precisely the outcomes consistent with common certainty of rationality and of the restrictions D. Hence, our approach to the analysis of incomplete-information games is consistent with Harsanyi's, and it may be viewed as capturing the robust implications of Bayesian equilibrium analysis.In dynamic games, D-rationalizability yields a forward-induction refinement of this set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. Focusing on the restriction that first-order beliefs be consistent with a given distribution on terminal nodes, we obtain a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. In signalling games, this refinement coincides with the Iterated Intuitive Criterion.

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We provide a simple behavioral definition of 'subjective mixture' of acts for a large class of (not necessarily expected-utility) preferences. Subjective mixtures enjoy the same algebraic properties as the 'objective mixtures' used to great advantage in the decision setting introduced by Anscombe and Aumann (1963).This makes it possible to formulate mixture-space axioms in a fully subjective setting. For illustration, we present simple subjective axiomatizations of some models of choice under uncertainty, including Bewley's model of choice with incomplete preferences (2002).

The phenomena of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, introduced in Daniel Ellsberg's seminal 1961 article, are ubiquitous in the real-world and violate both the key rationality axioms and classic models of choice under uncertainty. In particular, they violate the hypothesis that individuals' uncertain beliefs can be represented by subjective probabilities (sometimes called personal probabilities or priors). This chapter begins with a review of early notions of subjective probability and Leonard Savage's joint axiomatic formalization of expected utility and subjective probability. It goes on to describe Ellsberg's classic urn paradoxes and the extensive experimental literature they have inspired. It continues with analytical descriptions of the numerous (primarily axiomatic) models of ambiguity aversion which have been developed by economic theorists, and concludes with a discussion of some current theoretical topics and newer examples of ambiguity aversion.