Objective In this article, we offer an extended critical review of a new conception of bioethics, presented by Darlei Dall'Agnol, in the book Care and Respect in Bioethics. Methods Critical philosophical analysis of background assumptions of a new approach to bioethics, enriched with critical discussion of related philosophical literature. Results In Care and Respect in Bioethics, through an approach filled with hard cases, Dall'Agnol argues that the metaethics of respectful care has theoretical advantages over the intuitionist metaethics of principlism and the particularism of casuistry, offering an original comprehensive approach that crosses the three dimensions of ethical inquiry: metaethical, normative, and applied ethics. Conclusions Dall'Agnol offers an insightful and persuasive account of how the single attitude of respectful care can express practical moral knowledge in healthcare. In this paper, we evaluate, criticize, and suggest refinements. One of them concerns Dall'Agnol's interpretation about Stephen Darwall's views on care and respect as two attitudes supported, respectively, by a third‐ and a second‐personal moral point‐of‐view. Other is about the Dall'Agnol's Wittgensteinian description of the moral language‐games of Clinical Bioethics, adding to the approach the “language‐game of rights.”

Objective In this article, we evaluate and compare the frailties of two different standards of disclosure of information regarding the risks of medical procedures applied in recent judicial decisions in the United Kingdom. As an alternative, we present the tenets and philosophical grounds of an agency model of consent and a person‐based standard of disclosure. Methods Critical philosophical analysis of the background assumptions of two standards of disclosure and their relative “tests of negligence” applied in recent legal judgements in the United Kingdom. Results Both standards, the “Professional Practice Standard” (the traditional standard employed in Sidaway versus Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, 1985) and the allegedly new “Reasonable Person Standard” (mentioned in Montgomery versus Lanarkshire Health Board, 2015), can lead to malpractice if the medical‐patient relationship is not guided by attitudes of respectful care. The traditional standard is disrespectful as it does not take patients as full agents, presupposing that the patient's right is only a negative right to refuse what was deliberated only by the practitioner. The “new” standard can be disrespectful if the practitioner, concerned only with what a hypothetical reasonable individual would take as relevant for choosing between alternatives of treatment, does not know how to respect their real patient in a genuine shared decision‐making process. Conclusion We conclude that in order to know how to obtain valid informed consent, doctors need to engage in real conversations with their patients, revealing as much information as they, taken as real persons, need to be part of a genuine shared and respectful decision‐making process.

Nos projetos sociais de inclusão, esportes são estratégias privilegiadas. Mas esportes são jogos competitivos. Mas como poderiam práticas competitivas favorecer os objetivos generosos da inclusão? Neste artigo, pretendemos avaliar o problema buscando clarear os conceitos de "jogo", "esporte" e "competição", tendo como tema a "inclusão social". Trata-se de um ensaio que aborda um estudo teórico, cuja metodologia vale-se da análise filosófica e da argumentação dialética. Defenderemos que não há oposição entre competitividade e inclusão. Embora esportes sejam jogos de "soma zero", os esportes modernos são institucionalizados, o que permite a seus jogadores praticá-los como ocupações estáveis. Em conclusão, competições esportivas, institucionalizadas e disciplinadas, resultam em arranjos de soma positiva, permitindo que o esporte possa tornar-se uma escolha de vida, favorecendo, portanto, a inclusão.

In Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu present a sophisticated argument in defense of the imperative of moral enhancement. They claim that without moral enhancement, the future of humanity is seriously compromised. The possibility of ultimate harm, caused by a dreadful terrorist attack or by a final unpreventable escalation of the present environmental crisis aggravated by the availability of cognitive enhancement, makes moral enhancement a top priority. It may be considered optimistic to think that our present moral capabilities can be successfully improved by means of moral education, moral persuasion, and fear of punishment. So, without moral enhancement, drastic restrictions on human freedom would become the only alternative to prevent those dramatic potential outcomes. In this article, I will try to show that we still have reason to be less pessimistic and that Persson & Savulescu's arguments are fortunately unconvincing.

I propose a clinic-epidemiological concept of health as the best description of what physicians actually think about health within medical practice. Its aim is to be an alternative to the best approach in the philosophy of medicine about health, Christopher Boorse's biostatistical theory. Contrary to Boorse's 'theoretical' approach, I propose to take health as a practical clinical concept. In the first two parts of the paper, I will present my complaints against Boorse's view that health is a theoretical concept, a 'species normal functional ability'. I will claim that Boorse's view is actually a view on normal physiology. My claim is that health is best described as the state of absence of chronic diseases or disabilities (clinic-epidemiologically associated with a morbimortality index higher than the risk of death, disease and disabilities for individuals of the same population group or reference class free of that chronic clinical conditions). Health, therefore, is not the mere absence of disease. Diseases that do not increase patients' morbimortality and disability indexes are not incompatible with health; after all, clinical health is compatible with appropriate health care and medical treatments.