This study examines drivers of investment probability in equity-based crowdfunding using a hand-collected and comprehensive data set from a well-established platform. The analysis confirms several effects that have been reported in the recent literature on other crowdfunding markets. Extending recent research, we study moderators of local preferences of investors. Novel to the literature, we find that (1) local preferences are more pronounced in campaigns of younger ventures, (2) herding-like behaviour is stronger in local campaigns and (3) local investors are more responsive to updates posted by entrepreneurs, compared to non-locals. Our results suggest that investors allocate more attention to campaigns for which they have information advantages, such as local campaigns, due to their limited capacity to process information. Such behaviour may eventually amplify information asymmetry and local preferences. Our findings have practical implications for entrepreneurs, investors and platforms.

Purpose Crowdfunding creates multifaceted benefits for different agents who all desire to extract some of these benefits. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the allocation of crowdfunding benefits among crowdfunders, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists. Design/methodology/approach The present paper develops a multi-stage bargaining model with a double-sided moral hazard. Findings It is demonstrated that higher entrepreneurial bargaining power vis-à-vis the crowd may not always be beneficial for the venture. Most importantly, this is due to the reduced success probability of crowdfunding resulting from higher bargaining power of the entrepreneur. Bargaining power and the value of outside options determine the equilibrium allocation of crowdfunding benefits, expected venture value, and thus expected wealth of all agents. Practical implications Entrepreneurs face a tradeoff between venture quality gains and worse outcomes from crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding success and thus venture quality gains are the ultimate goal of policy makers if they aim to enhance the overall social welfare. Originality/value This paper is the first to investigate how multifaceted crowdfunding benefits are allocated between the crowd, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists. The paper furthers the development of an appropriate regulatory framework for crowdfunding by depicting new and original effects related to crowdfunding.

This study examines interdependencies between investments of equity crowdfunders. Based on hand-collected data from a well-established equitycrowdfunding platform, we find strong indication that investors observe previous investments to determine their willingness to pay for equity shares. Furthermore, the investment behavior of predecessors may lead investors to deviate from average investment behavior. In particular, investors are willing to pay more than the average investment, when the focal campaign is hot or there have been many large investments in the campaign. Remarkably, a high number of all previous investments over the entire period of the campaign as well as co-financing by presumably sophisticated investors negatively influence willingness to pay. This suggests that crowd investors are subject to partial crowding-out. These findings are different on the platform level, which suggests that investors' behavior is rather information than sentiment-driven.

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