Abstract:The article addresses a critical problem in the history of South Asian philosophy, namely the nature of the 'knowledge of knowledge' (svasam . vedana). In particular, it investigates how thé Saiva tantric school of the Pratyabhijñā (10th-11th c. CE) used the notion as an argument against the Buddhists' ideas on the nature of the self. The paper then considers the possibility that the source of theŚaivas' discussion was the work of the philosopher/grammarian Bhartr . hari (5th c. CE).

Although somewhat neglected in the scholarly debate, Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary (known as Sphuṭākṣarā or Paddhati, possibly 8th c. CE) on Vākya-padīya's first chapter, offers a remarkable analysis of Bhartṙhari's views on metaphysics and philosophy of language. Vākyapadīya's first four kārikās deal with ontological issues, defining the key elements of Bhartṙhari's non-dualistic edifice such as the properties of the unitary principle, its powers, the role of time and the ontological status of worldly objects. Vṙṡabhadeva's interpretation of the kārikās in question is intriguing and seems to be guided by the urgency to find a solution to the riddle which every non-dualistic theory has to face: how is it possible to postulate a unitary principle of reality when reality is cognized as multiple? In accomplishing the task Vṙṡabhadeva proposes various solutions (some of them based on concepts which are hardly detectable in Vākyapadīya and appear close to the ones propounded in certain trends of Advaita Vedānta), finally suggesting an explanation which, focusing on the pragmatic aspect of language, is altogether consistent with Bhartṙhari's theoretical picture.

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The article examines the impact the grammarian/philosopher Bhartṛhari (460–510) had on the way the ‘School of Recognition’ (Pratyabhijñā, tenth/eleventh c. CE) elaborated the notion that knowledge and consciousness have a close relationship with language. The paper first lays out Bhartṛhari’s ideas, showing that his theses are rationally defensible and philosophically refined. More specifically, it claims that the grammarian is defending a view which is in many respects similar to ‘higher-order theories’ of consciousness advanced by some contemporary philosophers of mind. In the second part, the paper shows how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta adopted Bhartṛhari’s scheme without significant alteration.

Vṛṣabhadeva's Sphuṭākṣarā, a commentary on the first chapter of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and its Vṛtti, offers a peculiar interpretation of the monistic ideas exposed at the beginning of the mūla text. The reflection on the status of ordinary reality and its relation with the unitary metaphysical principle is particularly interesting. Although according to Bhartṛhari's perspective the entities of the world are real, the Sphuṭākṣarā offers a more intricate picture in which different degrees of reality seem involved. Furthermore, the author adopts hermeneutical tools that are unusual in Bhartṛhari's texts, and comparable to those of Advaita Vedānta. In particular, the article will deal with Vṛṣabhadeva's use of the notion of 'inexpressibility' (anirvacanīyatva), as well as with other concepts which are typical of the scholastic phase of Advaita. In discussing these affinities the paper will also touch upon the problem of Vṛṣabhadeva's historical collocation.