A number of privacy risks are inherent in the Smart TV ecosystem. It is likely that many consumers are unaware of these privacy risks. Alternatively, they might be aware but consider the privacy risks acceptable. In order to explore this, we carried out an online survey with 200 participants to determine whether consumers were aware of Smart TV related privacy risks. The responses revealed a meagre level of awareness. We also explored consumers' attitudes towards specific Smart TV related privacy risks. We isolated a number of factors that influenced rankings and used these to develop awareness-raising messages. We tested these messages in an online survey with 155 participants. The main finding was that participants were generally unwilling to disconnect their Smart TVs from the Internet because they valued the Smart TV's Internet functionality more than their privacy. We subsequently evaluated the awareness-raising messages in a second survey with 169 participants, framing the question differently. We asked participants to choose between five different Smart TV Internet connection options, two of which retained functionality but entailed expending time and/or effort to preserve privacy.

The popularity of smart entertainment devices is growing every day. Products like blu-ray players, set-top boxes and Smart TVs (STV) with high connectivity are on the market. Many of them connect to the Internet via LAN or WiFi. Especially Smart TVs enable the broadcasting stations to provide real-time information directly to the consumers, for example additional information about a current TV program. HbbTV is one of the standards on STV for combining the two data media DVB and Internet. It defines how commonly used web technologies can be used as a transparent overlay over the current channel. Each respective broadcasting station is responsible for the contents of their channels' HbbTV signals.In this article, we describe how broadcasting stations measure the consumers viewing behavior more accurately using HbbTV. We show which technologies are used and which cause privacy risks, i.e., which methods lead to the exposure of personal preferences. Additionally, we describe a method how an evilminded neighbor is able to monitor the viewing behavior without the user's knowledge and consent. This method is possible on most channels using HbbTV. It is not even required that the user actively starts the HbbTV application. Beyond that, we can collect this data on an encrypted WiFi network as well. Finally, we discuss our implementation for significantly reducing the privacy risk HbbTV poses.

Confidence tricksters have always defrauded the unwary. The computer era has merely extended their range and made it possible for them to target anyone in the world who has an email address. Nowadays, they send phishing messages that are specially crafted to deceive. Improving user awareness has the potential to reduce their effectiveness. We have previously developed and empirically-validated phishing awareness programmes. Our programmes are specifically designed to neutralize common phish-related misconceptions and teach people how to detect phishes. Many companies and individuals are already using our programmes, but a persistent niggle has been the amount of time required to complete the awareness programme. This paper reports on how we responded by developing and evaluating a condensed phishing awareness video that delivered phishing awareness more efficiently. Having watched our video, participants in our evaluation were able to detect phishing messages significantly more reliably right after watching the video (compared to before watching the video). This ability was also demonstrated after a retention period of eight weeks after first watching the video.

Unlike PCs and mobile devices, smart TVs don't allow consumers to confi gure privacy and security options. A review of Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV, which delivers Web content to smart TVs and settop boxes, considers the implications of this limitation.S mart entertainment devices such as TVs, game consoles, and Blu-ray players are gaining popularity in households worldwide. Smart technology o ers users extra features and convenience by connecting to the Internet, with third parties providing real-time information and content directly to users' devices.In this article, we focus on Hybrid Broadcasting Broadband TV (HbbTV), a standardized technique for providing video on demand and information services to smart TVs and set-top boxes. According to a recent report, international interest in HbbTV is growing steadily; 1 in 2014, 92 percent of Germany's smart TVs had HbbTV functionality. 2 Essentially, HbbTV presents Web content as an overlay on regular TV programs. Although standard Web browsers on PCs and mobile devices support privacy and security options such as "private mode" and cookie preferences, smart TVs don't let consumers con gure such options. Here, we describe HbbTV and discuss its implications for consumers' privacy and security. Security and Privacye evolution of smart TVs and set-top boxes has expanded the interactions possible between consumers and devices, with multiple consequences for security and privacy. We can split these interactive functionalities into vendor and HbbTV applications.Vendor applications aren't standardized that is, they di er from vendor to vendor and from device to device and therefore aren't generally assessable. As discussed in the "HbbTV Standard" sidebar, the Digital Video Broadcast (DVB) stream triggers HbbTV applications. A DVB-level a ack can manipulate an HbbTV URL or, if applications are transferred by a DSM-CC (Digital Storage Media Command and Control) object carousel, the entire application. Yossef Oren and Angelos Keromytis showed that an a ack on the DVB stream can cause multiple devices to receive malicious URLs or content. 3 Because the HbbTV standard supports overlays on currently running TV programs, it's possible for a phishing a ack to cover the entire screen with malicious content. Even large-scale a acks via so ware vulnerabilities in underlying components are plausible; for instance, Andrew Karpow and Benjamin Michéle demonstrated how an a ack can execute system commands on outdated media players via USB sticks. 4 In short, if an HbbTV application uses a vulnerable media player, other malicious applications can exploit it. 5 e rst devices with HbbTV 2.0 support are expected to appear in 2016. Because the HbbTV 2.0 standard will allow increased interaction between HbbTV applications and other devices such as tablets and smartphones, appropriate security measures must guarantee that the HbbTV device controls only authorized and approved devices.is increased device interaction poses security concerns. Malicious HbbTV applications could control devices conne...