This article shows that national constructions of the Other are not fixed, but evolve as a result of policy makers’ agency, the domestic contestation among different identity narratives and their interaction with international structures. This is illustrated through an interpretive Social Constructivist approach and the Discourse-Historical Analysis (DHA) of narratives of Russia as an Other in German national identity. The article investigates the paradoxes of identity/difference and of continuity/change, which constitute the theoretical core of this Special Issue. It is argued that, in a longue durée perspective, narratives of Russia as an antagonistic Other have evolved and allowed for the emergence of less oppositional forms of difference. This change had an impact on German foreign policy, notably through the emergence of the cooperative Ostpolitik towards Russia. From the 1960s, Germany’s genocidal past was constructed as the main Other in national identity, whereas Soviet Russia was reconceptualised as an economic partner. I argue that this conceptualisation has proven remarkably resilient and has not disappeared in the context of the 2008 Georgian war and the current Ukraine crisis. While the Ostpolitik narrative temporarily lost momentum at the height of the crisis, it is ready to resurface as soon as structural conditions change.

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Today, energy represents the main challenge for every country. Given the dynamic and unpredictable form of supply and demand for energy in a global and globalized context, creating long-term policies as well as regional interior is vital to ensure energy security. In this context, the European Union,-as a main global actor-throughout the reform of the energy sector, wants to be on the cutting edge in the use of new technologies and the creation of a single energy market, not only inside the twenty eight member countries. Balkan countries have an important role in this process, which takes place inside the Energy Community. In these conditions, this article aims to analyse the recent transformation on European Union energy policy and provide an analysis of the commitments undertaken by Albania as a member of the Energy Community. 1. European Union Energy Policy: toward the implementation of new policies The European Union is in a critical stage of its energy policy. As the implementation phase of the 20-20-20 targets has already reached its interim point, the 28 member states are now discussing the targets for 2030. However, with an unfinished internal market for gas and electricity and with member states continuing to pursue bilateral energy relationships with supplier countries, the EU is still at the beginning of a common EU energy policy (CEPS, 2014). The EU is finally accepting that energy is too important to be ignored. Recent years have given us sufficient evidence that energy matters for the economy, for the environment, for social cohesion and solidarity and for local development and municipalities. Citizens care deeply about these areas, and the EU must be seen as addressing them. Energy Union should also be seen-at least from the perspective of the European Commission-as an attempt to infuse a new dynamic into the stuttering energy market and a more complicated climate change debate (S.Kurpas, Ch.Meyer, K. Gialoglou, 2014). In his mission letter to Arias Cañete, Jean-Claude Juncker asked the designated Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy to focus on further developing EU policy for renewables in order to "be a world leader in this sector" and on promoting the EU Emissions Trading System "to ensure that we reach our climate goals in a cost-effective way". Furthermore, he would like Alenka Bratušek, the designated Vice-President for Energy Union, to focus on "completing the internal energy market" and on "increasing competition"(F. Genovese, Ch, Egenhofer, 2014). At the beginning of the year (2014), Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger said that the European Union wanted strong and stable partnerships with important suppliers such as Russia, but that it must avoid "falling victim to political and commercial blackmail". He also said that the EU needed to complete the internal energy market, improve the energy infrastructure, become more energy efficient, and better at exploiting its own energy resources. Moreover, the Union needs to accelerate the diversification of external energy suppliers, espe...

This article analyses European Union (EU) negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Adopting Ansell and Trondal’s (2018) conceptualisation of turbulence, it argues that the pandemic intensified the environmental turbulence within which European policy makers had been operating following Brexit, the rule of law dispute with Poland and Hungary, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Organisational turbulence within EU institutions also affected the negotiations, particularly due to the reliance of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the political support of East-Central European governments that are sceptical of ambitious climate action. Moreover, the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament have taken different positions on the 2030 climate target and on the governance to pursue subsequent targets. Turbulence of scale—reflecting the nature of the EU as a multi-level actor—became relevant too, as the EU found it difficult to agree on its 2030 climate target due to disputes between member states and European institutions. European decision makers responded to turbulence through major policy initiatives, such as the EU Recovery Plan, the Green Deal agenda, and making funds conditional to the respect of the rule of law. They also pursued intra-EU compromises that accommodated different positions—for instance, on the Climate Law. Nonetheless, turbulence continues to pose a formidable challenge to the progress of the EU’s climate agenda.