The aim of this paper is to investigate whether banks adopt Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) practices to reduce reputational damage due to financial penalties and whether the adoption of ESG factors can reduce the probability to receive sanctions. This study extends a previous research (Guerello et al., North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2018, 48, 591–612) by including ESG scores as determinant of the probability to be sanctioned. The econometric analyses in this paper are based on a sample of 13 Italian banks for the years 2008–2018 and includes ESG scores provided by both Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. The research shows that ESG score and the probability of sanctions are positively related. However, a careful analysis of causal directions clarifies the meaning of such positive relationship: receiving financial penalties is detrimental for banks reputations, therefore it's necessary for banks to improve their reputation through the adoption of ESG practices.

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In this study, we investigate how economic agents choose gambling partners and how paired risky choices differ from individual ones. To this aim, we develop a simple model and design a laboratory experiment that allows us to compare individual versus paired decisions across two treatments, where pairs are, respectively, exogenously and endogenously formed. In both treatments, paired subjects decide individually and independently how to allocate their wealth over a portfolio of lotteries and fully commit to share any winnings. The main result from our experiment is that whenever agents are allowed to choose a gambling partner they decide to team up with other agents who display the same degree of risk aversion as themselves. Moreover, paired choices consistently involve higher risk taking than individual choices. This finding is more evident when information on subjects' risk attitudes is made available and when subjects team up in homogeneous pairs, thereby confirming that subjects successfully exploit the benefits of mutual insurance.

This study investigates the main factors driving the evolution of the securitization of loans to Italian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The value of securitization increased in last two years, even though it has not been used as collateral for central banks. The disposal of non-performing loans (NPLs) may have been rather triggered by increasing attention of the international institutions to such an issue, within the general purpose of financial stability. The purpose of this paper is to interpret such a phenomenon focusing on Italian banks and restricting the analysis to the case of securitizations backed with loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The interesting result that emerges, supported by econometrically tested empirical evidence, is that given the orientation of international financial institutions, such as the ECB and the EBA, and reacting to incentives coming from the fiscal policy authorities for the public guarantee of loans, banks have been using securitization to reduce the burden on their bad balance sheets due to (NPLs). It was found that the public guarantee had a positive impact on SME securitization, whereas securitization in other sectors has not been affected significantly. Such evidence suggests that, in the absence of a public guarantee, the financial stability target would have been at risk, and the effectiveness of collateral-based policies in the recent past must be improved to enhance access to credit for SMEs.