We analyse the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate value for a sample of 1,216 firms from 15 European countries. Our results stress two different conflicts of interest and show the differential role played by the mechanisms of corporate control depending on the legal and institutional environment. In common law countries, as a consequence of the relationships between managers and shareholders, capital structure and managerial ownership are the most effective mechanisms of control. In civil law countries, however, as a consequence of the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, the ownership concentration and the sharing of control within the firm become crucial. In this scenario, the second reference shareholder plays a critical role in contesting the control of the dominant largest shareholder in order to reduce the extraction of private benefits and improve the firm's performance. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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rEsUmEnEl objetivo de nuestro trabajo es conocer las preferencias que los estudiantes de primer curso de grado tienen sobre el profesor universitario ideal, el que desearían que les impartiera docencia en la universidad. Para ello, encuestamos a 947 estudiantes pre-universitarios pertenecientes a cuatro universidades diferentes y abordamos los principales aspectos que definen a un docente universitario (características personales y profesionales del profesor, sistemas de evaluación y tutorías y tecnologías de la información y comunicación (TICs) deseadas para la docencia universitaria). Los resultados muestran que los alumnos valoran especialmente que el profesor universitario ideal sea cercano, claro en las explicaciones, que evalúe mediante exámenes parciales a lo largo del curso, que oriente a los alumnos en la toma de decisiones sobre su posible futuro profesional en las tutorías y que utilice las TICs en su enseñanza porque ello les haría sentirse más preparados para aplicar sus conocimientos. PaLabras CLaVEEnseñanza superior, profesor, estudiante, perfil. abstraCtThe objective of this study is to discover the preferences of students in the first course of university degrees about their ideal university teacher, the one that students would like as their teachers at the university. To that aim, we interviewed 947 pre-university students belonging to four different universities dealing with the main aspects related to a university teacher (personal and professional characteristics, evaluation and tutorial systems and information and communication technologies (ICTs) desired for the university teaching). Results show that students particularly value that their university teacher is approachable, clear in their explanations, that they evaluate with mid-term exams throughout the academic year, that they orientate students about their professional future in tutorial hours and that they use ICTs in teaching, as students think that ICT use would allow them to be better prepared to apply their knowledge.

This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas’ performance from a dual perspective. First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while maintaining a political affiliation. We call these “hidden” political directors as politicians in disguise. Second, we analyze how political interests can prevent directors with financial expertise from applying their knowledge to improve cajas’ performance. Using a sample of hand-collected data from 45 Spanish cajas, we find that politicians in disguise destroy value in the caja and that politically motivated financial experts on the board do not benefit cajas’ performance. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G34, G21, G28

The aim of this paper is to analyse the influence of financial system liquidity and corporate leverage on a firm's overinvestment. We posit that when external funds are easily available, as in expansionary monetary periods, debt loses its traditional role as a managerial control mechanism. Instead, the supply of systemic liquidity results in corporate leverage exacerbating the problem of overinvestment. Using a sample of over 12,400 companies from 25 OECD countries between 2003 and 2014, our results show a significant and positive relationship between corporate leverage and overinvestment when the liquidity of the financial system is high, confirming the shift in the role played by leverage. At the macroeconomic level, our research raises certain caveats concerning worldwide liquidity injections. At the microeconomic level, our study shows that the disciplinary role of debt might become a false friend when money abounds.