Deploying insights from legal experts in New Zealand, this article examines how a union default could strengthen unions and boost their membership, while reconciling conflicting liberal and social democratic conceptions of freedom of association. The insights are used to develop a broad framework by which a default system could work both in New Zealand and more generally. These insights are then applied to the case of Britain, wherein components of the institutional architecture, embodied in Schedule A1 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, could be appropriately amended.

Drawing on survey findings, in this article the authors examine levels of public support in New Zealand for a union default. The key findings are that support is high (59%), that support is principally predicted by a belief in the default’s effectiveness for improving employees’ lives, and that this belief mediates a number of other predictors, such as union membership, non-union by choice, political party, household income, gender and age. There are strong grounds for believing this would translate into actual support for a union default and a consequent rise in union membership. These findings are contextualised with regard to Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States, where the authors draw out the implications for public policy and how a union default could be operationalised in the countries under study.

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