In a Shapley-Shubik assignment problem with a supermodular output matrix, we consider games in which each …rm makes a take-it-orleave-it salary o¤er to one applicant, and a match is made only when the o¤er is accepted by her. We consider both one-shot and multistage games. In either game, we show that there can be many equilibrium salary vectors which are higher or lower than the minimal competitive salary vector. If we exclude arti…cial equilibria, applicants'equilibrium salary vectors are bounded above by the minimal competitive salary vector, while …rms'equilibrium payo¤ vectors are bounded below by the payo¤ vector under the minimal competitive salary vector. This suggests that adopting the minimal competitive salary vector as the equilibrium outcome in decentralized markets does not have a strong justi…cation.We thank Takashi Hayashi, Fuhito Kojima, Al Roth, and Utku Ünver for their helpful comments. All errors are, of course, our own.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. One consequence of demographic change is substantial shifts in the age distribution of the workingage population. As the baby boom generation ages, the usual historical pattern of a high ratio of younger workers relative to older workers has been replaced by a pattern of roughly equal percentages of workers of different ages. One might expect that the increasing relative supply of older workers would lower the wage premium paid for older, more experienced workers. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayThis paper provides strong empirical support for this hypothesis. Econometric estimates imply that the size of one's birth cohort affects wages throughout one's working life, with members of relatively large cohorts (at all stages of their careers) earning a significantly lower wage than members of smaller cohorts. Estimated elasticities of wages with respect to the relative size of one's own cohort are generally between -0.05 and -0.10, and are of similar magnitude for men and for women. Our results suggest that cohort size effects are quantitatively important and should be incorporated into public policy analyses.JEL Classifications: J11, J21, J26

This paper investigates whether a search engine's ordering of algorithmic results has an important effect on website traffic. A website's ranking on a search engine results page is positively correlated with the clicks that it receives. This could result from the search engine's accurately predicting the websites relevance to users. Or it could result from users merely clicking on the highest ranked links, regardless of the website's relevance. Using a unique dataset, we find that a website's rank, not just The analysis for this paper was performed in conjunction with ongoing work for Microsoft Corporation; Keystone and Seabright acknowledge financial support from Microsoft. The primary data that were used in the analysis come from log files from Microsoft's Bing search engine and include the website names, search result rankings, and click-through rates for results that were presented in response to user search queries on Bing.com. Supplementary data for additional website click-through rates were derived from additional Microsoft opt-in consumer panel data that contained online behavior. The authors are grateful to Elan Fuld, who provided excellent research assistance; to Scott Gingold, who was involved with the project from the beginning and gave us invaluable feedback, ideas, encouragement and support; and to Thierry Magnac, who gave us invaluable econometric expertise and spent much time helping us to understand the data.M. Glick Department of Economics, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA e-mail: glick@economics.utah.edu its relevance, strongly and significantly affects the likelihood of a click. We also find evidence that rank influences CTRs partly by controlling access to the scarce attention of users, but primarily by substituting the reputational capital of the search engine for the reputation of individual websites.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. While Social Security's Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is increasing to 67, the Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) remains at 62. Similar plans to increase the EEA raise concerns that they would create excessive hardship on workers who are worn-out or in bad health. One simple rule to increase the EEA is to tie an increase to the number of quarters of covered earnings. Such a provision would allow those with long work lives-presumably the less educated and lower paid-to quit earlier. We provide evidence that this simple rule would not satisfy the goal of preventing undue hardship on certain workers. Therefore, this paper considers an alternative policy that ties an increase in the EEA to individuals' Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). We show that allowing workers with low AIME to continue to be eligible to receive benefits at age 62 has promise as a policy to protect workers who have low earnings and are in poor health from hardship associated with an increase in the EEA. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. One consequence of demographic change is substantial shifts in the age distribution of the workingage population. As the baby boom generation ages, the usual historical pattern of a high ratio of younger workers relative to older workers has been replaced by a pattern of roughly equal percentages of workers of different ages. One might expect that the increasing relative supply of older workers would lower the wage premium paid for older, more experienced workers. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayThis paper provides strong empirical support for this hypothesis. Econometric estimates imply that the size of one's birth cohort affects wages throughout one's working life, with members of relatively large cohorts (at all stages of their careers) earning a significantly lower wage than members of smaller cohorts. Estimated elasticities of wages with respect to the relative size of one's own cohort are generally between -0.05 and -0.10, and are of similar magnitude for men and for women. Our results suggest that cohort size effects are quantitatively important and should be incorporated into public policy analyses.JEL Classifications: J11, J21, J26