This article analyzes the ownership structure of state-owned companies and their role in the Russian economy. Using a sample of 114 of the largest Russian companies, we estimated direct and indirect state participation as a percentage of shareholdings for direct and indirect federal property during the time period of 2006-2014. We used two methods to estimate the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which allowed us to compare our results with OECD and Rosstat statistics for a broader sample of Russian companies owned by the public sector. This study revealed a decline in SOEs' share in the capitalization of the Russian stock market and a slight increase in their share of total revenues and employment. The results indicated that public SOEs demonstrated significantly higher productivity compared to non-public SOEs and private companies had a distinct advantage in productivity compared with public SOEs. Despite the significant advantages in productivity of private companies over the SOEs, over a 9-year period, we observed that this gap narrowed. This may be due to conditions of high financial volatility and stagnation of the economy that result in certain advantages for SOEs in terms of access to sources of long-term funding and other forms of state support. However, SOEs with indirect state control experienced a rapid growth in revenue and productivity compared to other firms. This may indicate the presence of a specific stock selection mechanism for transferring more effective SOEs from direct state ownership to indirect control as an alternative to privatization.

This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the "real sector" affect profitability is examined parti cularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

This article analyzes the impact of the increase of an investment horizon on the comparative advantages of the basic asset classes and on the principles of constructing the invest ment strategy. It demonstrates that the traditional approach of portfolio management theory, which states that investments in stocks are preferable over bonds in terms of their long-run risk-return trade-offs, is by no means always consistent with empirical evidence. This article proves the opposite, i.e., that for long-term investors, investments in stocks, arguing in favor of strategies pursued by pension funds and other institutional structural bonds. Emphasis is placed on the need for regular adjustments to long-term investors' portfolios. As portfolios get older, those investors see a reduction in the returns' dispersion, while differences in risk between various portfolios increase. This means tion process. This thesis becomes especially relevant in the context of retirement savings management. reserved.

The paper examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The authors have tried to discriminate the influence of direct and indirect state ownership. Using econometric analysis we conclude that the size of the block of shares owned by the state has negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on average perform worse than private companies. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of indirect productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs the similar correlation between return on equity and efficiency characteristics was not revealed. The study shows that the increase of the size of direct government ownership leads to lower productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect state ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

This article analyzes the key patterns of the dividend policy and the problem of the “dividend puzzle” in the general context of the development of the stock market in Russia. The article consists of two parts.In the first part we summarize main research trends of dividend policy in modern economic theory (the classical Modigliani—Miller theory of dividend irrelevance, agent and signal hypotheses, the smoothing model, the catering theory, etc.). We emphasize the theoretical analysis of motivation of the largest Russian companies for profit allocation and dividend payout, based on a sample of 236 joint stock companies. Since 2012, a steady increase in dividend payments has been revealed in both private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The bulk of dividend payments from SOEs accounts for only 12 major companies. Along with an increase in the market value, dividends have become an important factor in the total return on shares. Under current conditions, the probability of paying dividends depends not only on the size of the company and indicators of its’ financial stability, but also on the presence of the state in the capital of companies. However, the relationship between the probability of paying dividends and state participation in the ownership structure is not universal and can be explained by specific factors that go beyond the classical dividend theories.In the second part we will analyze the patterns of stock market performance and dividend policy of the largest Russian companies, motivation for dividend payouts and special aspects of SOEs policy.