One can often encounter claims that classical (Kolmogorovian) probability theory cannot handle, or even is contradicted by, certain empirical findings or substantive theories. This note joins several previous attempts to explain that these claims are unjustified, illustrating this on the issues of (non)existence of joint distributions, probabilities of ordered events, and additivity of probabilities. The specific focus of this note is on showing that the mistakes underlying these claims can be precluded by labeling all random variables involved contextually. Moreover, contextual labeling also enables a valuable additional way of analyzing probabilistic aspects of empirical situations: determining whether the random variables involved form a contextual system, in the sense generalized from quantum mechanics. Thus, to the extent the Wang-Busemeyer QQ equality for the question order effect holds, the system describing them is noncontextual. The double-slit experiment and its behavioral analogues also turn out to form a noncontextual system, having the same probabilistic format (cyclic system of rank 4) as the one describing spins of two entangled electrons.

Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.

There is growing interest in the effects of sports-related repetitive head impacts (RHIs) on athletes' cognitive capabilities. This study examines the effect of RHIs in data collected from adolescent athletes to estimate the magnitude and longevity of RHIs on sensorimotor and cognitive performance. A non-linear regression model estimated the longevity of RHI effects by adding a half-life parameter embedded in an exponential decay function. A model estimate of this parameter allows the possibility of RHI effects to attenuate over time and introduces a mechanism to study the cumulative effect of RHIs. The posterior distribution of the half-life parameter associated with short-distance headers (<30 m) is centered around 6 days, whereas the posterior distribution of the half-life parameter associated with long-distance headers extends beyond a month. Additionally, the magnitude of the effect of each short header is around 3 times smaller than that of a long header. The results indicate that, on both tasks, response time (RT) changes after long headers are bigger in magnitude and last longer compared to the effects of short headers. Most important, we demonstrate that deleterious effects of long headers extend beyond 1 month. Although estimates are based on data from a relatively short-duration study with a relatively small sample size, the proposed model provides a mechanism to estimate long-term behavioral slowing from RHIs, which may be helpful to reduce the risk of additional injury. Finally, differences in the longevity of the effects of short and long RHIs may help to explain the large variance found between biomechanical input and clinical outcome in studies of concussion tolerance.

Where does the study of the flow of time belong: physics, the cognitive sciences, philosophy, or somewhere else? Physicists and philosophers have set themselves up into two camps: those who believe there is genuine flow or becoming in the world and those who believe there is just a block of events. What had not been considered is whether the subjective feeling of flow of time is the same the world over, whether it could be tampered with by brain injury, or whether it is present at all developmental stages. We lay out the problem, explain terms, and provide synopses of relevant ideas.