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This article argues that nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose in military calculations; moreover, their continued retention invites the dangers of further proliferation and of accidental use. They are thus defined here as obstacles to, rather than as facilitators of, international security. Seven reasons are presented to support this contention, including an assessment of the moral implications and the strategic limitations of nuclear weapons. Despite these limitations, and the recent commitments made by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, nuclear weapons remain central to the strategic doctrines of these states. Several reasons are put forward to explain why this retention continues, including the unchanging nature of strategic mindsets, the presence of vested interests, and now, in the case of the USA at least, a renewed reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of how appropriate and effective such a strategy might be against emerging terrorist or `rogue state' threats.

The idea of "human security" is gaining attention among policy-makers and security analysts. Little scholarly attention has been given to the questions of why states accept (or reject) a human security agenda or how such an agenda is incorporated into policy practices. The article suggests that a human security approach is most likely to be applied when both humanitarian and national interests combine. Yet when states or organisations adopt a human security approach, they often misjudge the complex and long-term commitment required of such an approach. There is also the potential for such an agenda to be manipulated to justify questionable courses of action. These issues frame an analysis of six recent case studies.

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This paper examines the role of the Canberra Commission in terms of consolidating and influencing the agenda on international negotiations towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commission’s Report is significant for two main reasons. First, it represents a unique form of disarmament diplomacy by the Australian Government which combined the post‐Cold War international climate of security cooperation with the foreign policy aspirations of an activist middle power. Second, the Report refutes the strategic, technological and political arguments against nuclear elimination in a comprehensive and convincing manner, arguing that without elimination, the world faces increased threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This paper thus concludes that the Canberra Commission has been instrumental in strengthening the taboo against the possession, testing or use of nuclear weapons.