Three questions guide this research: Would nullifications occur in active euthanasia cases where the right to die is asserted? What sentiments would the community express, and how would those sentiments relate to nul/ifications? What variabIes would best predict verdict? Mock jurors offered reasons for their verdicts for four cases where all elements of first degree murder appeared to be satisfied. The cases varied the competency of the patient, the intent of the patient--if the wish to die was expressed, and whether a living will was present, and whether the defendant sought court approval. Sizable nullifications (25% not guilty verdicts) and partial nullifications (39% guilty to lesser offenses) resulted. Some subjects viewed this as not a legal matter, but a private matter; others acknowledged the taw's place, but viewed the law's position as wrong; still others nullified by using a common sense rather than a legal definition of malice. In this life-and-death matter, black letter law and common sense justice were not only far apart, but, in the eyes of some, irreconcilably so.Americans today are living approximately 25 years longer than their ancestors of 1900, with much of the credit going to advances in medical science (Mattarazzo, 1984). But living longer is not necessarily living better. To take but one example, there are "'an estimated 10,000 patients who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative stage" (Keilitz, Bilzor, Hafemeister, Brown, & Dudyshyn, 1989

Subjects had to make a “remove” or “do not remove” life‐sustaining measures decision in three right to die cases where the patients differed in competence; for half the subjects, a living will was present in all the cases, whereas, for the other half, it was not. Subjects also gave their determinative reasons for their decisions. Support for the right to die varied by case, but not by competency, or by the presence of a living will. The subjects' reasons were highly predictive of their decisions, and related to the way case‐specific facts were construed, revealing a number of disparities between the way courts and citizens construe whether the patient's condition is “terminal,” “irreversible,” and “painful,” or not. Beyond construing facts differently, the results also revealed a disparity between evolving case law and the community's “common sense justice” over a fundamental belief: whether dying is seen as private matter, outside the bounds of State intervention, or not.