In this article, we investigate how communication and trust networks between employees affect participation in a strike. We analyze whether the strength of network relations is related to congruence in strike behavior using social network data on 59 Dutch workers. We find that private communication networks and trust networks lead to similar strike behavior. This finding indicates that networks not only promote protest mobilization but are also vehicles for demobilization, albeit through different network relations.

This paper studies how employees anticipate change in social relations after a strike in their organisation. We hypothesise that two group norms affect employees' fear that a strike deteriorates the social relations with their colleagues. We distinguish between two different norms associated with a collective action problem such as a strike. A 'solidarity norm' prescribes that workers should participate in collective protest when called for. A 'free rider punishment norm' describes whether and how violators of the solidarity norm should be treated. While the former itself theoretically does not impact intra-group social relations, the latter one does. We test our hypotheses on a data set of 468 Dutch union members. Adherence to the free rider punishment norm significantly increases a fear for deterioration of social relations with colleagues after a strike, while adherence to the solidarity norm does not. We also find a moderating effect of expected proportion of strikers. The results are discussed with reference to industrial relations theory and mobilisation theory, further probing into mechanisms that relate social norms to the (anticipated) costs of participation and the quality of social relations after a strike.

This article studies how participation norms affect workers’ willingness to strike. A factor analysis on the responses of 468 Dutch union members about appropriate behavior during a strike produces two factors. The first factor reflects a “solidarity norm” favoring group solidarity; the second factor reflects a norm about the treatment of defecting colleagues, which we call the “free-rider-punishment” norm. Using OLS regression, we show that adherence to these norms significantly affects union members’ willingness to strike, controlling for group identification, and past participation in strikes. This article contributes to a deeper understanding of how solidarity and free-rider-punishment affect future participation.

We investigate two questions regarding the effect of information on participation in labor strikes: First, how are social identification and trust used as filters for information? Second, we investigate how cross-pressures affect willingness to participate. Using a dataset of 468 union members, we test hypotheses about the relationships between information, identification, trust, and participation with structural equation modeling. Specifically, we find that information from and identification with the union are highly important determinants of participation. Regarding information from management, trust is the most important determinant for preventing workers from participation. We also find a difference between workers who have previous strike experience and those who do not. These findings indicate that workers use different mechanisms for filtering information, depending on the source of information. This is a new discovery in mobilization research.

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