No abstract

We examine the impact of media coverage on firm‐level productivity and find that firms with higher media coverage are associated with higher productivity. Using the launch of Barron's Online as a quasi‐shock to media coverage, we document that this relationship is causal. Further exploration shows that the positive media–productivity relationship is stronger for firms with weaker governance mechanisms and for those with higher levels of information asymmetry. We also identify an increase in reputational and career concerns and a reduction in managerial shirking as channels through which media coverage affects firm‐level productivity. The results are robust to alternative explanations and endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings suggest that media coverage reduces managerial opportunism, and thus enhances resource deployment decisions.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers of bankrupt firms are more or less conditionally conservative in their financial reporting relative to non-bankrupt firms. The study further examines the cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism among bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs a sample of US firms to investigate conditional conservatism in firms that experience financial distress and go bankrupt relative to non-stressed non-bankrupt firms. The study also uses switching regression models to identify the drivers of the cross-sectional difference in conditional conservatism among bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.FindingsEmpirical results show that bankrupt firms are timelier in recognizing bad news than good news when compared to non-bankrupt firms. The higher level of conditional conservatism in bankrupt firms is mainly driven by their higher levels of leverage and tax-reduction incentives. The cross-sectional analyses show that these results largely hold for more leveraged firms and firms with higher tax costs. Taken together, these results suggest that the conservative tendency of managers of bankrupt firms can stem from the agency problem between lenders and managers and from tax-decreasing motivations.Originality/valueThe novelty of the authors’ research stands in studying the drivers of the cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms and specifically, the demonstration that taxation also induces conditional conservatism in the setting of ex post bankrupt firms.

No abstract

No abstract