-We develop and estimate a microeconometric model of household labour supply in four European countries with differing economies and welfare policy regimes: Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. We then simulate, under the constraint of constant total net-tax revenue (fiscal neutrality), the effects of various hypothetical tax-transfer-reform basic-income policies: Guaranteed * This work is part of a CHILD (Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics, www.child-centre.it) project. Colombino, project coordinator, developed the microeconometric model and is responsible for the interpretations and opinions expressed. O'Donoghue created datasets for the microeconometric model and performed initial experiments. Narazani and Locatelli worked on datasets and the initial estimation exercises. Narazani performed the recent estimations and simulations. We thank Isilda Shima (at the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research) who contributed under a research contract with the Department of Economics of Turin. We thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.Copyright ©2010 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.Minimum Income, Work Fare, Participation Basic Income and Universal Basic Income. We produce indexes and criteria by which the reforms can be ranked and compared to current tax-transfer systems. The exercise can be considered as one of empirical optimal taxation, where the optimization problem is solved computationally rather than analytically. Many versions of basic income policies would be superior to the current system, and the most successful are not meanstested (Universal or Participation Basic Income) and adopt progressive tax rules. If constraints other than fiscal neutrality are considered, such as the implied top marginal tax rate or the effect on female labour supply, the picture changes: unconditional policies remain optimal and feasible in Denmark and the United Kingdom; while in Italy and Portugal universal policies appear instead to be too costly in implied top marginal tax rates and adverse effects on female participationconditional policies such as Work Fare emerge as more desirable there.

In spite of relatively generous public subsidies and a reputation for high quality, only a very limited proportion of Italian families use public child-care and a large proportion use informal care. In this paper, we attempt to explore the determinants of the use of child-care among dual workers families. Given the limitations of data available we match two different data sets: the Bank of Italy (SHIW) and ISTAT Multiscopo. We find evidence that the availability of public child-care affects in an important way its demand. We also find that increases in costs of public child-care reduce the use of public as well as private indicating a shift to informal child-care. The presence of a grandmother who lives near and is in good health is an important explanation of the choice especially in presence of very small children. An understanding of the importance of these factors is relevant in the evaluation of child-care policies. This is particularly important in Italy, where the majority of families with children have only one child and children would benefit also from the socialization aspects of the child-care system. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005working mothers, child-care, J2, C3, D1,

This paper focuses in particular on the 1992 tax reform in Norway. In this reform the top marginal tax rates were cut considerably. We find that the impact on overall labor supply is rather modest, but these modest changes shadow for stronger sectoral changes. The tax reform stimulated the women to shift their labor from the public to the private sector and to work longer hours. A calculation of mean compensated variation, calculated within the framework of a random utility model, shows that the richest households benefited far more from the 1992 tax reform than did the poorest households. Copyright � The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2009. .

Aggregate evidence has revealed a significant increase in women's labour market participation (especially among married women) and a decline in male participation, both in Italy and in all the other OECD countries. This paper empirically tests the relationship between the education and employment status of husbands and wives using the Bank of Italy Survey (1995). The results of our analysis show that employed women are likely to be married to employed men with a higher level of education and higher income. The estimates of the labour supply decisions of wives show that the effect of the unemployment status of husbands is mediated by other factors associated with the family's view of wives working outside home. The response to a husband's unemployment depends significantly on the employment decisions of parents (mothers and mothers-inlaw), a proxy for the couple's attitude towards women's work.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe develop and estimate a microeconometric model of household labour supply in four European countries representative of different economies and welfare policy regimes: Denmark, Italy, Portugal and United Kingdom. We then simulate, under the constraint of constant total net tax revenue, the effects of 10 hypothetical tax-transfer reforms which include various alternative versions of a Basic Income policy. We produce various indexes and criteria according to which the reforms can be ranked. The exercise can be considered as one of empirical optimal taxation, where the optimization problem is solved computationally rather than analytically. As long as the ranking of reforms is done according to welfaristic criteria it turns out that the most successful policies are those involving non means-tested versions of basic income and adopting progressive tax-rules. When other criteria (such as the implied top marginal tax rate or the effect on female labour supply) are also taken into account, the picture changes: universalistic policies remain optimal and feasible in countries like Denmark where female participation rates are very high; instead, in countries with low female participation rates (like Italy) universalistic policies appear to be too costly in terms of implied top marginal tax rates and in terms of adverse effects on female participation, and meanstested policies such as Work-Fare or Negative Income Tax seem more desirable. JEL Classification: C25; H24; H31, I38