The discourse generated by interactions between phenomenological and scientific perspectives is characterised by a particularly rich exchange between the specific and the general, the foundational and the applicative. That is, discussions about the insights produced by particular collaborations often feed into and enrich (rather than only occurring in succession to) debates over fundamental questions about the very possibility of any genuine cooperation between these discourses. The dialogue between phenomenology and the sciences seems to recognise almost more than any other that the conditions of its existence in general can come into view much more clearly in light of the challenges and benefits that arise in the context of specific negotiations.The present chapter seeks to take advantage of this dynamic. It will examine how one particular proposal for interdisciplinary collaboration deals with conflict between the perspectives that it asks to cooperate, in the hope of shedding some light on the kinds of negotiations that make for fruitful dialogue between the phenomenological tradition and the natural sciences more generally. The proposal in question -a call for sustained cooperation between Heideggerian phenomenology and the enactivist approach to cognitive science -is one that I have set out and defended in detail elsewhere; hence, for the purposes of this chapter I shall proceed as if such a partnership is both desirable and possible (at least in principle). 1 While I will offer a very brief outline of the intersections between Heideggerian

The enactive approach is becoming increasingly influential within the philosophy of cognition, to the extent that it is now one of the dominant models of embodied cognition -an umbrella term for a varied set of discourses sharing the view that our minds don't just happen to be 'in' bodies, but are enabled, shaped and (at least partly) constituted by the specifics of our physicality. This chapter will argue that the rise of enactivism is particularly relevant to transhumanist discourses, and vice versa, because their concerns intersect and conflict in vital ways. The discussion will use three core enactivist themes -organisational integrity, embodiment, and precarity -to draw out the kinds of tensions and intersections that enable enactivism and transhumanism to problematise one another.Enactivism defines life and cognition in terms of autonomy; that is, it posits that living systems generate and maintain themselves as porous yet bounded self-unities. This sets up a delicate balance -both for the enacting system and for enactivism itself -between the dual imperatives of adaptive self-creation and homeostasis. The system must change constantly in order to sustain itself, yet there is a limit to the system's flexibility. Beyond a certain point, change mea ns disintegration, and disintegration means death. This balance itself resonates within transhumanist discourses, in the tension between the promise of radical self-transformation and the concern about taking this too far. These discourses, however, also challenge enactivism's potential to capture the full potential of the kinds of systems it describes. How do we determine the limits of morphological flexibility for cognisers as complex as ourselves? Are those limits fixed or malleable -and must integration always mean death, or can it facilitate redefinition? organisational integrity, embodiment, and precariousness -to draw out the kinds of tensions and intersections that enable enactivism and transhumanism to problematise one another.Enactivism defines life and cognition in terms of autonomy; that is, it posits that living systems generate and maintain themselves as porous yet bounded self-unities. This sets up a delicate balance -both for the enacting system and for enactivism itself -between the dual imperatives of adaptive self-creation and homeostasis. The system must constantly change to sustain itself, yet there is a limit to the system's flexibility. Beyond a certain point, change means disintegration, and disintegration means death. This balance itself resonates within transhumanist discourses, in the tension between the promise of radical self-transformation and the concern about taking this too far. These discourses, however, also challenge enactivism's ability to capture the full potential of the kinds of systems it describes. How do we determine the limits of morphological flexibility for cognisers as complex as ourselves? 1 Are those limits fixed or malleable -and must disintegration always mean death, or can it facilitate redefinition?According to e...

This paper explores the implications of conceptualising phenomenology as explanatory for the ongoing dialogue between the phenomenological tradition and cognitive science, especially enactive approaches to cognition. The first half of the paper offers three interlinked arguments: Firstly, that differentiating between phenomenology and the natural sciences by designating one as descriptive and the other as explanatory undermines opportunities for the kind of productive friction that is required for genuine ‘mutual enlightenment’. Secondly, that conceiving of phenomenology as descriptive rather than explanatory risks committing us to what Zahavi (2019) identifies as the error of equating the phenomenological with the phenomenal. Finally, that the erroneous reduction to the descriptive occludes the rich resources that the phenomenological tradition can contribute to investigations of non-human cognition. The second half of the paper then turns to focus specifically on the promising relationship between phenomenology and enactive approaches to cognition. It will suggest that phenomenology must be seen as having explanatory capacities if it is to shed light on the structures of “mind in life” (Thompson, 2007), before drawing on the model of explanation put forward by Louis Sass to explore what this might look like.

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Simone de Beauvoir and Frantz Fanon both argue that oppression fundamentally constrains the subject’s relationship to and embodied experience of time, yet their accounts of temporality are rarely brought together. This paper will explore what we might learn about the operation of different types of reductive temporality if we read Beauvoir and Fanon alongside each other, focusing primarily on the early works that arguably lay out the central concerns of their respective temporal frameworks. At first glance, it seems that these two models of temporality have radically different emphases. While Beauvoir suggests that reductive temporalities work to sever the future from the past and present, Fanon locates this destructive operation in the heightening of their entanglement. However, I will contend that there are deep affinities between these accounts: For both Beauvoir and Fanon, freedom is bound up with futurity, with its lack therefore cashed out in terms of stagnation, repetition, and the entrapment within a hollow moment that prevents authentic projection. Both resist teleological perspectives; problematize the endeavor to describe the structures of lived temporality in neutral terms; and show that temporality is crucial to the pursuit of a political phenomenology. These resonances, however, should only serve to recast rather than dissolve the tension between their approaches; ultimately, we need to acknowledge the distinctiveness of their differing concerns and aims.