The war in Syria, given its complexity and geopolitical importance, has received much recent analytical attention. Although many perspectives have been covered, there is still a need in Western sources to view the conflict more through Russia's lens. This article thus looks at how Russia has designed and executed its military strategy in Syria to fit into its overall grand strategy. It examines exactly how the Russian 'strategy of limited actions' has been employed and why Russia has now been proclaimed as the one true 'victor' in the whole Syrian imbroglio.

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This article takes the current debate between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches as a point of departure to make its contribution by shifting the focus from the operational and tactical to the strategic realm. To this end, it traces the meanings of each approach to its historical origins, discussing the theoretical underpinnings as to distill the basic tenets and to evaluate to what extent each is suitable to counter an insurgency. The central argument of this article is that while both approaches have different "philosophies," they are two sides of the same coin. Thus, what needs to be taken into account is the strategic dimension and, logically enough, the political, when referring to counterinsurgency as the two will be determinant in which approach is employed.