What if the fiscal risk is not negligible? Could the Central Bank continue effectively bringing inflation to the target when it ignores the default risk? To address those questions, we propose a small open economy DSGE model with an endogenous fiscal limit, where the government can default on its domestic bonds, and monetary authority may account for that. We evaluate dynamics under two different Central Bank decision rules: when (i) it wrongly tracks that risk, and (ii) it perfectly tracks default risk. The model is calibrated based on Brazilian data, as its recent budgetary deterioration makes the country an ideal case to be studied. We find that high inflation and depreciated currency coexist with a high interest rate when the monetary authority does not fully account for the default risk. The higher the default probability, the greater the differences across the effects of the two types of policy rules that we analyzed. For a central banker to restore the inflation target, she must fully track default risk in its decision rule. In addition, our model generates an endogenous premium across countries' interest rates due to differences in sovereign default risk.