No abstract

Several studies suggest that the extractive industry has negative consequences for gender equality despite the often positive growth impact of natural resources. We re-examine this claim at the sub-state level in sub-Saharan Africa and argue that we need to differentiate between ownership arrangements in the extractive industry. To test our argument on the gender dimension of the resource curse, this article employs unique data on the control rights of minerals within sub-Saharan countries as well as data from Afrobarometer and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Our quantitative analyses explore how international vs. domestic ownership of copper, diamond and gold mines affects the labor market integration of females and intimate partner violence. The regression results suggest in line with our theoretical expectations that gender-specific structural labor market shifts within extractive industries are contingent on mineral control rights. Our models show that within mining areas, only domestic ownership reduces male unemployment. While domestic mining seems to reinforce the traditional male breadwinner model, internationally owned mineral extraction induces structural labor market changes: women

According to the resource curse theory, persistent violence in developing areas results from rebels’ ability to finance warfare with natural resource revenues. Surprisingly, this overlooks the complexities of raising revenue from a mobile mining population that values security as well as income. The literature thus neglects a fundamental question: what are the incentives of rebel groups to prevent or perpetuate conflict in mining areas? This paper delineates a rational to both increase and decrease violence. Protecting a mine should allow rebels to extract taxes in return. Simultaneously, to maintain this demand for security, rebels may need to destabilize the wider area. The hypotheses are tested with novel data on rebel taxation at over 3’000 artisanal mines in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Supporting the hypotheses, the results show that rebel-taxed mines appear exempt from violence nearby but imperiled at the perimeter.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractQualitative studies and media reports suggest that the presence of Chinese oil or mining companies generates resentments among local extractive communities due to low wages, poor working conditions, environmental degradation, the employment of foreign labour, and perceived racial discrimination. At the same time, Chinese investment in the extractive sector appears to enhance local infrastructure. So far, these claims have not been empirically tested in a systematic way. Relying on novel data on the control-rights regimes of diamond, gold, and copper mines and geo-referenced information from Afrobarometer surveys, this paper examines whether Chinese-controlled mining promotes anti-Chinese sentiments among the local populations of sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, we test the effect of mining contractors' nationality on socio-economic indicators such as local employment rates and infrastructure levels. Our logistic regression analysis for the period 1997-2014 reveals that the effect of Chinese mining companies on African local development is ambiguous: while proximity to Chinese-operated mines is associated with anti-Chinese sentiments and unemployment, populations living close to Chinese mining areas enjoy better infrastructure, such as paved roads or piped water. Multilevel mixed-effects estimations using district-level data from the Demographic Health Survey for 20 sub-Saharan countries corroborate these findings.

No abstract