BackgroundDuring the last decade there has been a growing concern about the lack of results in the health sectors of many low income countries. Progress has been particularly slow in maternal- and child health. Prompted by the need to accelerate progress towards these health outcomes, pay-for- performance (P4P) schemes have been initiated in a number of countries. This paper explores the perceptions and experiences of health workers with P4P bonus distribution in the health system context of rural Tanzania.MethodsThis qualitative study was based on the P4P pilot in Pwani Region of Tanzania. The study took place in 11 health care facilities in Rufiji District. The study informants and participants were different cadres of health workers assigned to different outpatient and inpatient departments at the health facilities, and local administrators of the P4P bonus distribution. Thirty two in-depth interviews (IDIs) with administrators and health care workers, and six focus group discussions (FGDs with Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) staff, non-RCH staff and non-medical staff were conducted. Collected data was analyzed through qualitative content analysis.ResultsThe study found that the bonus distribution modality employed in the P4P programme was experienced as fundamentally unjust. The bonuses were calculated according to the centrality of the health worker position in meeting targeted indicators, drawn from the reproductive and child health (RCH) section. Both RCH staff and non-RCH perceived the P4P bonus as unfair. Non-RCH objected to getting less bonus than RCH staff, and RCH staff running the targeted RCH services, objected to not getting more P4P bonus. Non-RCH staff and health administrators suggested a flat-rate across board as the fairest way of distributing P4P bonuses. The perceived unfairness affected work motivation, undermined teamwork across departments and created tensions in the social relations at health facilities.ConclusionOur results suggest that the experience of unfairness in the way bonuses are distributed and administered at the health facility level undermines the legitimacy of the P4P scheme. More importantly, long term tensions and conflicts at the workplace may impact negatively on the quality of care which P4P was intended to improve. We argue that fairness is a critical factor to the success of a P4P scheme and that particular attention should be paid to aspects of workplace justice in the design of P4P bonus structures.

BackgroundPrompted by the need to achieve progress in health outcomes, payment for performance (P4P) schemes are becoming popular policy options in the health systems in many low income countries. This paper describes the policy process behind the introduction of a payment for performance scheme in the health sector of Tanzania illuminating in particular the interests of and roles played by the Government of Norway, the Government of Tanzania and the other development partners.MethodsThe study employed a qualitative research design using in-depth interviews (IDIs), observations and document reviews. Thirteen IDIs with key-informants representing the views of ten donor agencies and government departments influential in the process of introducing the P4P scheme in Tanzania were conducted in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Oslo, Norway. Data was collected on the main trends and thematic priorities in development aid policy, countries and actors perceived to be proponents and opponents to the P4P scheme, and P4P agenda setting in Tanzania.ResultsThe initial introduction of P4P in the health sector of Tanzania was controversial. The actors involved including the bilateral donors in the Health Basket Fund, the World Bank, the Tanzanian Government and high level politicians outside the Health Basket Fund fought for their values and interests and formed alliances that shifted in the course of the process. The process was characterized by high political pressure, conflicts, changing alliances, and, as it evolved, consensus building.ConclusionThe P4P policy process was highly political with external actors playing a significant role in influencing the agenda in Tanzania, leaving less space for the Government of Tanzania to provide leadership in the process. Norway in particular, took a leading role in setting the agenda. The process of introducing P4P became long and frustrating causing mistrust among partners in the Health Basket Fund.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12992-015-0125-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Background Tanzania is one of many low income countries committed to universal health coverage and Sustainable Development Goals. Despite these bold goals, there is growing concern that the country could be off-track in meeting these goals. This prompted the Government of Tanzania to look for ways to improve health outcomes in these goals and this led to the introduction of Payment for Performance (P4P) in the health sector. Since the inception of P4P in Tanzania a number of impact, cost-effective and process evaluations have been published with less attention being paid to the experiences of care in this context of P4P, which we argue is important for policy agenda setting. This study therefore explores these experiences from the perspectives of health workers, service users and community health governing committee members. Methods A qualitative study design was used to elicit experiences of health workers, health service users and health governing committee members in Rufiji district of the Pwani region in Tanzania. The Payment for Performance pilot was introduced in Pwani region in 2011 and data presented in this article is based on this pilot. A total of 31 in-depth interviews with health workers and 9 focus group discussions with health service users and health governing committee members were conducted. Collected data was analysed through qualitative content analysis. Results Study informants reported positive experiences with Payment for Performance and highlighted its potential in improving the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of care (AAAQ). However, the study found that persistent barriers for achieving AAAQ still exist in the health system of Tanzania and these contribute to negative experiences of care in the context of P4P. Conclusion Our findings suggest that there are a number of positive aspects of care that can be improved by Payment for Performance. However its targeted nature on specific services means that these improvements cannot be generalized at health facility level. Additionally, health workers can go as far as they can in improving health services but some factors that act as barriers as demonstrated in this study are out of their control even in the context of Payment for Performance. In this regard there is need to exercise caution when implementing such initiatives, despite seemingly positive targeted outcomes.

Women's education is currently at the center of international development discourse. In the discourse on education and development, "education" has tended to mean primary-and to an extent, secondary-education. The issue of higher education has so far received modest attention. This article examines the global situation of women, higher education, and development; suggests some possible reasons for the modest academic as well as policyrelated debate on the issue; and considers some implications of the situation for analyses of women's higher education achievements in developing contexts. It is argued that cultural context may play a major role in how women's higher education is perceived, valued, and employed. Seen from an economic growth-related perspective, investment in women's higher education may therefore appear less cost-effective than investment in men's. However, seen from either a rights-based or a human development perspective, which considers women's education and gender parity to be central indicators of development in themselves, women's higher education stands out as a highly effi cient way of shaping more gender-equitable societies and thus as a major vehicle for general development.