While the extractive industries (EI) are of major significance economically, the reporting of their activities has been the subject of contentious debate posing dilemmas for regulators and standard setters over many decades. In order to ensure alignment with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) research project on EI, we first identify some important economic characteristics of EI and associated accounting challenges together with an overview of how current accounting standards deal with these challenges using International Financial Reporting Standards as the focus. Second, we conduct a review of extant research on EI reporting analyzed around the key areas of: (a) international diversity of accounting practices and the challenges facing information users; (b) standard-setting processes and lobbying behaviour that deals with why the IASB (and other standard setters) have not succeeded in developing rigorous standards for extractive activities; (c) the reporting of oil, gas, and mineral reserves, given that large proportions of the assets of EI firms (the reserves) are off-balance sheet; (d) environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting dealing with how EI firms have increased their reporting of ESG information in response to regulatory demands and pressure for voluntary disclosures; and (e) other EI related topics such as earnings management, risk disclosures, and voluntary disclosure behaviour. Finally, we present some conclusions together with suggestions relating to key areas for future research on EI reporting.

Drawing on prior literature on audit fees, client reputation, and corporate governance, we posit that a material adverse event at a firm, such as a financial fraud allegation, leads to an increase in the audit fees of firms connected to the former by a board interlock. We propose two possible mechanisms to explain the upward pressure on audit fees: a client-side effect, where the client demands additional audit services, and an auditor-side effect, where the auditor raises its audit fees due to a perceived increase in audit engagement risk. The results indicate an average marginal increase of 12.86% in audit fees in the year following the public revelation of financial fraud. Additional analyses suggest that an auditor-side effect is in place, while we cannot find clear evidence supporting the client-side effect. Furthermore, we document that the positive effect on audit fees persists for up to at least 2 years after public disclosure of the event when the interlocked director serves as a member of the audit committee. JEL Descriptors: G34, M40, M42

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This article investigates the link between board members’ past professional experiences and the terms and conditions of the debt contracts of their current firms. In particular, we examine whether directors’ past bankruptcy experience affects the pricing and nonpricing terms of public debt contracts. Using a sample of 8,142 bond issues in the United States in the period 1995 to 2015, we document higher credit spreads and smaller bond sizes for firms with such directors, suggesting that bondholders are concerned about past bankruptcy experience. Our results remain robust to different model specifications. This effect is moderated for bankruptcies that are likely driven by macroeconomic shocks such as the dotcom bubble and the global financial crisis. We also show that our findings are not explained by bond issuers with an elevated risk of default and seem instead to be driven by directors serving on key monitoring committees, indicating that prior bankruptcy experience raises concerns about the company’s corporate governance. Finally, mediation analysis offers some evidence of a limited negative indirect effect of prior bankruptcy experience on the terms of debt contracts through the firm’s financial and investment policies. Overall, our findings suggest that lenders incorporate information about past professional experiences of directors into public debt contracting.

Using a large sample of Swedish private firms, we investigate the link between the prior corporate bankruptcy experiences (BEs) of directors and CEOs and the financial risk of their current firms. We find that firms with directors and CEOs previously involved in bankruptcies exhibit more aggressive corporate financial policies, have a higher corporate bankruptcy risk and are subject to a higher cost of debt. Our findings align with an innate characteristics explanation: corporate BEs and current corporate risk‐taking reflect personal risk preferences. Furthermore, while we find evidence of income losses for CEOs and directors involved in bankruptcies, such losses are transient, potentially explaining the risk‐taking behavior after experiencing bankruptcy. Overall, our results suggest that the presence of individuals with prior BE can be considered a signal of higher financial risk for their firms. This insight is relevant to regulators, lenders and corporate decision‐makers.