Recent research on European integration has largely profited from the institutionalist turn in political science. Theoretical progress has, however, been hampered by the diverse understandings of this new research tradition. This paper tries to tackle the conceptual diversity in a positive way. We first analyze the neo-institutionalist turn in political science and European studies and then move on to a detailed analysis and comparison of the three competing approaches -sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism. Next, we will show that the main differences are as much epistemological as theoretical. A convergence towards a unifying institutionalist approach can thus only be possible if some sort of a methodological convergence takes place. We sketch how a synthesis between the competing schools might appear.'In my country there is a belief . . . that the only thing separating us from the animals is mindless superstitions and pointless rituals'.

This essay examines the causes of government support for European integration. It evaluates several competing theories, both material and ideological. Two dependent variables are examined: government support for European integration in Council of Ministers decisions, and in the 1997 Amsterdam intergovernmental conference. There appear to be sharp differences between the two decision-making fora in the efficacy of predictive variables. In the Council of Ministers, left-right political ideology and financial transfers from the European Union to member states provide the best explanations. In the Amsterdam conference, experience in the Second World War and financial transfers provide the best explanations. This research extends our understanding of why governments choose co-operation within the European Union. It also extends our understanding of the relationship between ideology and integration preferences. Ideology matters not just to parties, but also to governments, which represent both territorial interests and ideologies. There appears to be a linear relationship, whereby left governments are more supportive of integration than right governments.

Europeanization is an example of initial bargains between states leading to ongoing political adjustment within the states. In this article I apply the concept to NAFTA and look at two of its member states, finding that despite the low level of institutionalization, NAFTA has set in motion new forms of political organization and behaviour, and new demands for political action. This is especially marked in Mexico, and in certain sectors. It is also clearly visible in the changing patterns of cross-border bureaucratic communication. The main conclusions are that: (1) even in a lightly institutionalized regional trade agreement, the institutional, legal and civil society capacity of less-developed members is strengthened; (2) despite the absence of a formal process of policy or institutional development and the lack of legislative instruments, NAFTA has begun a hidden process of domestic adjustment in technical and specialized areas; and (3) like the EU, pressures to expand and strengthen NAFTA have emerged as a result of the initial agreement as well as extraneous factors. These conclusions may offer lessons to the study and practice of regional organizations elsewhere.

Transparency guarantees in Mexico presented a serious challenge to its 2007–2012 war on drugs. We use an original database of access to information requests, including both petitions for information and appeals to IFAI. We conduct statistical tests on the databases, finding that transparency is lower on security issues, as expected, but that there are unexpected variations between security agencies, and over time. We then conduct a content analysis of freedom of information requests to determine what drives agency responses, finding that security agencies developed various techniques to deflect petitions for information, such as falsely claiming that information has been provided when it has not, claiming that the information is outside the competence of the agency, that it does not exist, or that it is already in the public domain. Also there are significant differences in transparency between security agencies, possibly explained by their operational roles.

Scholars examining British-European relations typically ascribe UK governmental positions firstly to a combination of distinct and incompatible values, attitudes, and beliefs stemming from historical experience; secondly to a distinct and incompatible set of functional imperativesnamely less interaction with European partners than is the case for other EU member states; and third a distinct and incompatible set of domestic interests. This article challenges these views. It presents evidence to suggest that British governments have failed to assimilate social demands, and that the reason is an under-recognized and untheorized intervening variable -namely the structure of decisionmaking institutions in Parliament. It models the influence of this variable, and suggests that historical institutionalist theory captures key elements of the variable in a manner superior to extant approaches.It is the character of the people which determines the institutions which govern them and not the institutions which give people their character. It is about being British and about what we feel for our country, our Parliament, our traditions, and our liberties. Because of that history, that feeling is perhaps stronger here than elsewhere in Europe. (Margaret Thatcher, 10 December 1991)