We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005 to 2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation, and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries.We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and companyspecific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective 'management' of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions.

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Until 1970, British banks were firm believers in the merits of 'non-disclosure', which obscured their 'true' profits and capital through profits smoothing and the use of hidden reserves. Many other companies adopted the same view for as long as legislation permitted, but there were special reasons why non-disclosure endured for longer in banking. This paper examines the persistence and demise of non-disclosure in banking, placing it in the context of the wider development of financial reporting in Britain, and highlights similarities and differences in financial reporting between banks and other types of company.

It has long been contended that British commercial banking, for most of the twentieth century, was not competitive; it has sometimes been described as a 'complex' or 'collusive' oligopoly. This is said to account for the banks' allegedly sluggish, conservative and inefficient behaviour -part of the capital market failure that was said to contribute to Britain's relative economic decline. Some would date the cartel from the mid to late nineteenth century, most would accept it from around 1920 and its classic period is usually thought of as lasting from 1945 to 1971. This is more commonly asserted than demonstrated and the purpose of this article is to examine more closely the evidence relating to this assertion.The history of British banking suggests that at least some characteristics of an emerging oligopoly were present from an early date. Some agreements limiting competition between the banks certainly existed from as early as the mid nineteenth century. The extent of merger and takeover activity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also gives the impression of a movement from a highly competitive system to a highly concentrated one.2 At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were hundreds of banks in the country but, by World War I, comparatively few. From then on the system was dominated by the 'Big Five' clearing banks -Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Provincial and Westminster. This certainly had the appearance of an oligopoly, which was then said to harden as time went by such that during the interwar years, and certainly by the 1950s and 1960s, it was a thorough-going cartel.The persistence of a cartel for such a long period would surprise most economists, though part of the explanation could lie in strong official support for such an

In a globalised world, when financial crisis strikes, can countries which are well-integrated into the world financial system escape? Recent experience suggests not. In the early 1930s, Britain's openness at the centre of the world financial system left it vulnerable, particularly to the central European financial crisis. Yet there was no financial crisis in Britain in 1931, rather an exchange-rate crisis, and sterling left the exchange-rate regime of the gold exchange standard. The most important financial institutions, the joint-stock commercial banks, the central part of the payments system, remained robust and contributed to the stability of the British economy.globalisation, British banks, the 1930s, contagion, crisis, stability,