Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Panel estimates based on 19 transition economies suggests that some central banks may aim at comparatively high inflation rates mainly to make up for, and to perhaps exploit, lagging internal and external liberalization in their economies. Out-of-sample forecasts, based on expected developments in the underlying structure of these economies, and assuming no changes in institutions, suggest that incentives may be diminishing, but not to the point where inflation levels below 5 percent could credibly be announced as targets. Greater economic liberalization would help reduce incentives for higher inflation, and enhancements to central bank independence could help shield these central banks from pressures. Terms of use: Documents in

CONTENTS ivThis Occasional Paper analyzes the experience of countries that have implemented very sizable fiscal adjustments over the past three decades. It aims to identify key conditions and institutional approaches that have contributed to sustained outcomes and to favorable macroeconomic developments.

Abstract:Panel estimates based on 19 transition economies suggests that some central banks may aim at comparatively high inflation rates mainly to make up for, and to perhaps exploit, lagging internal and external liberalization in their economies. Out-of-sample forecasts, based on expected developments in the underlying structure of these economies, and assuming no changes in institutions, suggest that incentives may be diminishing, but not to the point where inflation levels below 5 percent could credibly be announced as targets. Greater economic liberalization would help reduce incentives for higher inflation, and enhancements to central bank independence could help shield these central banks from pressures.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.On occasion, a government may find itself confronted with a need to address a large contingent or off balance sheet fiscal liability. Implementing a settlement raises issues of fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability. This paper surveys the key design issues, and draws lessons from recent Eastern European experience. It then considers in more detail the particular case of Ukraine, and how it might approach its own large contingent liabilitythe so-called lost savings-which at end-2007 amounted to as much as 18 percent of GDP.

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