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Purpose-This paper aims to report on a survey of medium and large Irish firms to ascertain reasons for not changing to more advanced costing techniques, namely, activity-based costing (ABC). Developments in technology and recent poor economic conditions would suggest that the technique could be adopted more by firms, as they make increased efforts to keep costs under control. Design/methodology/approach-A survey instrument was used to gather data drawing from the top 1,000 Irish firms. From a useable population of 821 organisations, a response rate of 20.75 per cent was achieved. Findings-Findings show a rate of adoption of ABC of 18.7 per cent, which is lower than previous studies in an Irish context. The level of information technology in firms is not a key factor for non-adoption. Instead, the main reasoning for non-adoption revolve around stable existing costing methods, which firms expressed satisfaction with. Originality/value-This research suggests the adoption of ABC is not necessarily driven by external factors such as technology and economic shocks, at least in the context of Ireland. It also suggests that costing techniques may be deeply embedded within organisations and are less likely to be subject to change.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to establish whether Irish listed firms comply with the substance of corporate governance guidance rather than the letter of the rule in the determination of director independence. The paper examines non-executive director independence from three perspectives: the first is from the viewpoint of the sample firms, the second from that given in corporate governance guidance when applied to the sample firms, and the third based on extensive financial statement analysis, prior research and prior literature. By exploring multiple perspectives of director independence, disparities in the interpretation of non-executive director independence can be identified. Design/methodology/approach – Descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical analysis are used to examine for differences between multiple perspectives of non-executive director independence. Findings – The study identified significant disparities in the interpretation of independence by Irish listed firms. This may be explained by a misunderstanding of what director independence means, a deliberate choice to ignore pre-existing norms regarding NED independence or the desire to exceed such norms. The findings suggest Irish financial institutions exhibit higher levels of NED independence than the remaining sample firms explained in part by linkages with the institutions themselves. Findings suggest a lack of adequate oversight in the sample firms, which could ultimately lead to greater agency costs for shareholders. Practical implications – Policymakers and other stakeholders valuing director independence may need to reassess guidelines for interpreting director independence and related reporting, policies regarding adherence to such guidelines and associated director training requirements. Originality/value – This study is timely, topical and the first of its kind in relation to Irish listed firms and provides evidence into the lack of compliance within Irish listed companies with best practice guidance. The findings clearly identify a notable lack in a consistent means of interpretation in the sample firms as to what non-executive independence is and why it is an important part of good corporate governance. The paper provides a basis for future research. Such research may include studies of firm motivation in interpretation choice and comparative studies with other jurisdictions.

This paper examines the association between opportunistic income increasing earnings management and corporate governance in UK firms with a particular focus on the independence of non-executive directors on the board and audit committee. Novel features of our study are the development of a specific accruals methodology to measure opportunistic earnings management based on insights from financial statement analysis and the construction of a comprehensive profile of director independence based on information disclosed in financial statements. Our measure of earnings management is not associated with non-executive director independence or share ownership, but it is significantly associated with the role and equity ownership of the chief executive officer.

A fundamental aspect of good corporate governance is the protection of shareholders and their investments. These stakeholders are now demanding increasing levels of transparency in all aspects of business with a greater emphasis being placed on non-financial information for investment decision making. While the majority prior research has examined the corporate governance practices of the firm, research investigating the actual disclosure of corporate governance practice is scarce. This study contributes to this debate by providing exploratory evidence on the levels of corporate governance disclosure quality and compliance in a sample of 40 UK listed firms throughout the period 2002 to 2009. Findings report a notable increase in disclosure quality and compliance over this period with the greatest increase occurring from 2002 to 2004/05 and suggest that firms are responding to calls from investors.