This paper develops a theory of strategic group identity that explains how strategic groups emerge in an industry and how they can affect firm behaviors and outcomes. In so doing, it provides a theoretical basis for the existence of strategic groups. We argue that managers cognitively partition their industry environment to reduce uncertainty and to cope with bounded rationality. Social learning theory and social identification theory are used to describe how cognitive groups coalesce into meaningful substructures and how a group‐level identity emerges. We describe the ways in which macro level factors condition the development of groups and their identities. We introduce the notion of a strong identity, which characterizes any group sufficiently recognized and attended to by members to affect individual action. Groups with ‘weak identities’ are no more than transient agglomerations of firms and do not exist in any meaningful sense. These ideas are developed into propositions that describe the conditions under which groups with strong identities are likely to emerge. A second set of propositions describes their transformation over time. Identity strength is linked to both positive and negative outcomes in a final set of propositions. We show how strategic groups with strong identities can affect firm performance, resolving a longstanding problem which has plagued strategic groups research and conclude by suggesting some approaches for measurement and future research. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Academy of Management is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Academy of Management Journal.Firms compete for reputational status in institutional fields. Managers attempt to influence other stakeholders' assessments by signaling firms' salient advantages. Stakeholders gauge firms' relative merits by interpreting ambiguous informational signals from the firms, the media, and other monitors. The results of an empirical study of 292 large U.S. firms supported the general hypothesis that publics construct reputations on the basis of information about firms' relative structural positions within organizational fields, specifically using market and accounting signals indicating performance, institutional signals indicating conformity to social norms, and strategy signals indicating strategic postures. Understanding the informational medium from which publics construct reputations helps explain sources of mobility barriers within industries that originate in external perceptions.

This paper offers a framework and methodology for resolving the question regarding the existence of strategic groups. We say that a strategic group exists if characteristics of the group affect firm performance independently of firm‐level and industry‐level effects. We argue that group‐level effects are a byproduct of strategic interactions among members, and develop an empirical testing model, based on the ‘New Economics of Industrial Organization,’ to distinguish true group effects from spurious effects. From this model, we derive a series of logically consistent propositions, suggesting that while strategic interactions are critical for a group‐level effect on profits, mobility barriers are necessary to preserve both groups and their effects over time. A review of prior empirical studies of strategic groups suggests that the inconclusive nature of prior research has been due more to the lack of a theoretical foundation for empirical analysis than to the nonexistence of groups. To the extent that our methods have been employed, there is limited evidence that a rigorous search for strategic groups may prove fruitful. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and alliances are potential alternative choices for managers. We propose that three dimensions of industry conditions are likely to be influential in such choices: (1) industry demands on firms to make significant commitment, (2) the environmental pressures for flexibility, and (3) the limitations on firm choices stemming from industry concentration and institutional conditions. We develop propositions about how differences across these three dimensions influence the choices that firms make between M&As and alliances.