No abstract

No abstract

SummaryAs civil conflicts between ethnic or religious groups have increased in number, the United Nations has developed greater effectiveness in intervening in such conflicts and has made preventive measures a focus of planning and undertakings of the UN system. One obstacle to implementing preventive measures is the problem of national sovereignty. This article looks at the still relatively unused potential of the UN to deploy military troops as a measure to deal with crises of serious magnitude before they erupt into genocide, highlighting both the obstacles posed by state sovereignty and the potential for success. The article offers a comprehensive study of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter to show how they can operate to authorize the UN to take action to prevent impending genocide. Further, Security Council action in southern Rhodesia, northern Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda is examined, both illustrating the potential of early military action and raising questions about the timing of preventive measures. The article concludes that the most important challenge facing the UN is how to improve its capacity to prevent impending genocide. The success of military action in preventing genocide will determine the acceptance of future preventive measures of this nature, as states weigh whether the cost to their sovereignty is reasonable in view of the benefits obtained.

SummaryDiscussion surrounding the prevention of genocide has focused to a large extent on the appropriate mode(s) of reaction to particularly serious breaches of human rights obligations. In particular, the question arose whether existing UN mechanisms aimed at preserving international peace and security should be regarded as a privileged — or even exclusive — means to enforce compliance by states with their obligations relating to genocide. Drawing extensively on the work of the International Law Commission on the codification of the law of state responsibility, the author argues that the new draft articles, with their emphasis on “serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law” rather than obligations erga omnes, are ill-suited to provide for the taking of preventive measures by “not-directly affected” states. Paradoxically, the institutionalization of mechanisms for preventing gross human rights abuses has been reduced to a minimum in the new draft, with emphasis being laid on the vague requirement that states “cooperate” to bring “serious breaches” to an end. It is suggested, however, that ascribing a subsidiary role to UN organs and procedures is, despite criticisms made as to their adequacy, necessary to supplement state action. The UN has in fact a distinct legal interest that is clearly affected when breaches of obligations relating to genocide occur. More importantly, by acting on behalf of the “organized international community” in matters of international peace and security, the Security Council has itself assumed today a legally binding subsidiary obligation to prevent genocide. The article concludes that in the absence of ineffective decisional institutions for the prevention of genocide, the choice is not between the subjectivism of a decentralized response and the absence of any consequences for the most serious wrongful acts but rather to strengthen the UN’s institutional capacity to react.

No abstract