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Cyber-physical systems are under constant and increasing attacks as components of the critical infrastructure. Additive manufacturing systems are a new class of cyber-physical systems that produce threedimensional objects layer by layer. Agencies and companies such as NASA, the European Space Agency, General Electric and SpaceX have explored a broad range of application areas for additive manufacturing, including creating functional parts of safety-critical systems such as jet engines. The range of application areas and dependence on computerization makes additive manufacturing an attractive target for attackers.This chapter focuses on attacks that seek to change the physical properties of additive-manufactured components. Such attacks can weaken, damage or destroy manufactured components and, in scenarios where weak or damaged components are used in safety-critical systems, potentially endanger human lives. Attacks intended to damage additive manufacturing equipment and additive manufacturing environments are also discussed.

The pervasiveness of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in various aspects of the modern society grows rapidly and CPS become attractive targets for various kinds of attacks. We consider cybersecurity as an integral part of CPS security. Additionally, the necessity exists to investigate the CPS-specific aspects which are out of scope of cyber-security. Most importantly, attacks capable to cross the cyber-physical domain boundary should be analyzed. The vulnerability of CPS to such cross-domain attacks has been practically proven by numerous examples, e.g., by the currently most famous Stuxnet attack.In this paper, we propose a taxonomy for description of attacks on CPS. The proposed taxonomy is capable of representing both conventional cyber-attacks as well as cross-domain attacks. Furthermore, based on the proposed taxonomy, we define an attack categorization. Several possible application areas of the proposed taxonomy are extensively discussed. Among others, it can be used to establish a knowledge base about attacks on CPS that are known in the literature. Furthermore, the proposed description structure will foster the quantitative and qualitative analysis of these attacks, both of which are necessarily to improve CPS security.

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