This article aims to introduce the study of Itō Jinsai from the point of view of the value of his Confucian interpretations within the context of the project of Confucian ethics—in other words, trying to ascertain in what ways Jinsai’s project can help facilitate the study of Confucian ethics beyond the realm of intellectual history in the global context of the 21st century. It is imperative to allow Jinsai’s notions, as much as possible, to speak for themselves; but it is also of great importance to first place Jinsai within his own time and inside the intellectual space in which he formulated his ideas. A number of scholarly sources will be considered, with the intention of illuminating Jinsai’s work from a few different angles.

Confucianism cannot be posited as merely a philosophical tradition, but can nevertheless be said to possess key elements of a philosophy of ethics, which have time and again been able to transcend both the tradition’s historical as well cultural bounds. While Huang Chun-chieh points out that it is more appropriate to speak of Confucianisms, plural, core Confucian values and notions possess the ability to move from context to context while retaining certain characteristics and changing others. The proper approach to the study of Confucianisms should therefore be interdisciplinary and in line with the new method of East Asian Confucianisms, where philosophy should also have an important part to play. Understood within the bounds of the project of Confucian philosophy (a project that can be seen as dynamic and ongoing in the global environment of the 21st century), a broader and more diverse range of expressions of Confucian thought—particularly through the methods of both East Asian Confucianisms and of comparative philosophy as an effort of a more equal and inclusive philosophical dialogue—could help throw new light on important aspects of Confucian philosophical thought. While the methods of East Asian Confucinisms and of comparative philosophy are different in their aims and scope, they also share common sensibilities.

The present article juxtaposes selected elements of the Humean position on moral motivation with the ethical teachings of the Edo period Japanese Confucian scholar Itō Jinsai—especially the latter’s critical reading of the notion of structural coherence li, his defence of human feelings as the fundamental ground of moral motivation and his views on the origins of moral sentiment. In doing so, the article aims to show that there is an interesting line going through Jinsai’s work that might be argued to bear, within the philosophical project of Confucian ethics, similarities to certain of Hume’s more famous positions, which it actually predates.

Ogyū Sorai conceptualizes "learning" as the study of the way of the ancient kings. The way thus represents the rites, music, penal laws and administrative systems which the ancient kings established. Making faith in the sages the foundation of learning, Sorai designates the ancient kings as intermediaries between the ordering activity of heaven and human society. This article tries to examine some of the implications of such a conceptualization, both for the proposed system of social organization as well as for Sorai's own project of elucidating the way.Keywords: Ogyū Sorai, Tokugawa Confucianism, learning, way of the ancient kings, sages Sledenje poti kitajskih prakraljev: koncept »učenja« v poučevanju Ogyū Soraija IzvlečekOgyū Sorai »učenje« pojmuje kot preučevanje poti kitajskih prakraljev. Pot predstavljajo obredje, glasba, kazenski zakonik in administrativni sistemi, ki so jih zasnovali prakralji. S tem, ko zaupanje oziroma vero v prakralje postavi za temelj učenja, Sorai prakralje določi za posrednike med urejevalno dejavnostjo neba in človeško družbo. Članek poskuša pokazati nekatere posledice takšnega pojmovanja tako za predlagani sistem družbene organizacije kot za Soraijev lastni projekt razjasnitve poti.Ključne besede: Ogyū Sorai, konfucijanstvo v obdobju Tokugawa, učenje, pot prakraljev, svetniki

) nedvomno sodita med učenjake, ki so ključno zaznamovali japonsko miselno pokrajino obdobja Tokugawa (1603Tokugawa ( -1868. Njuna nauka predstavljata vpliven trend kritičnega pretresa ustaljenih miselnih tokov tistega časa, posebej smeri, ki so temeljile na izpeljavah kitajske Šole strukture (J: Rigaku, K: Lǐ xué 理学) ter predstavljale vodilno strujo takratnega japonskega konfucijanstva.Oba misleca se navadno prišteva k učenjakom Šole starodavnega nauka (J: kogaku 古学), ki naj bi na Japonskem predstavljala antitezo Zhu Xijevemu (1130-1200) nauku -vendar pa je Šola starodavnega nauka označba, ki v resnici zajema precej različne nauke in pristope. Jinsai je svojo šolo natančneje imenoval Šola starodavnega pomenoslovja (J: kogigaku 古義学), Sorai pa svojo Šola starodavnih besed in fraz (J: kobunjigaku 古文字学). Šoli se razlikujeta tako na vsebinski kakor tudi na metodološki ravni.Pričujoči članek se v tem smislu loteva analize treh osrednjih pojmov konfucijanske etike, da bi s tem pokazal na pomensko fl eksibilnost znotraj ustaljenega pojmovnega repertoarja tedanje konfucijanske miselne tradicije ter hkrati zarisal enega ključnih momentov, kjer se Jinsaijev in Soraijev projekt temeljno odmakneta drug od drugega. Medtem ko je Jinsai skušal predvsem razrešiti teoretične probleme, ki so se mu v naukih Šole strukture nakazovali kot s heterodoksijami onesnaženi napačni nastavki za pravilno konfucijansko prakso, je Sorai sodobno konfucijansko izročilo ostro kritiziral prej z vidika napačne metodologije in posledično samovoljnih izpeljav, ki naj ne bi v zadostni meri upoštevale resničnega izvora poti.Takšna različna izhodišča pa, kot se pokaže, oba misleca pripeljejo do na videz podobnih, vendar v jedru temeljno različnih izpeljav.