Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether religion or national culture can explain previously observed cross-country variation in trade credit. Design/methodology/approach Using the firm-level SME data from 35 European countries, religion and cultural factors of Hofstede and Schwartz, the authors provide new evidence on the determinants of the cross-country variation in trade credit. Findings The results indicate that religion and national culture are associated with trade credit. The authors find that the levels of trade credit are higher in Catholic countries than in Protestant ones and that peoples’ religiousness has an impact on trade credit only in Catholic countries. The authors also find that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, such as power distance and uncertainty avoidance, are positively associated with trade credit. Practical implications Overall, authors’ findings indicate that religion and national culture are important determinants of trade credit management, and that the association between commonly used cultural values and trade credit depends on the religious, legal, and financial environment. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to research the relationship between national culture and trade credit.

This study examines the homogeneity of BIG4 audit reports after implementing key audit matters (KAMs) in the context of fair value accounting. We focus on reported KAMs and the procedures related to the fair values of investment properties, particularly those related to challenging management's estimations and valuation specialists' use. Our data consist of 235 individual audit reports from the real estate sector from 2017 to 2018 and cover 60% of the listed real estate companies in the EU, Switzerland, and Norway. We found that the BIG4 audit firms are not homogenous in their audit reports. There is a statistically significant difference among the BIG4 audit firms in reporting the challenge of management estimates and in the number of audit procedures. We also found that a country's legal origin plays a significant role when auditors report KAMs. Our findings contribute to the current audit quality and reporting literature.

This paper focuses on whether the rule of law or capital market development can explain observed differences in working capital levels and trade credit in SMEs from 13 EU countries. Our findings indicate that the working capital levels are lower and working capital management is thus more efficient in countries with safer legal systems and better investor protection. We also find that operating in a market‐based capital system has a negative effect on the cash conversion cycle (CCC). This implies that firms operating in countries with a market‐based system as opposed to a bank‐based system have better opportunities to manage their working capital. Our findings indicate that country‐level legal instruments explain much of the cross‐country differences observed in working capital. The results also suggest that working capital practices and the extent to which trade credit is used are a product of the legal system and the financial systems in place in each country. If the financial system changes, the trade credit practices can also be expected to change.

This study examines the role of auditors and monitoring banks in the tax aggressiveness of private firms. We use a unique data set of private small and medium‐sized entities (SMEs) in Finland where book–tax alignment is high and the auditing of private firms (exceeding a low threshold) is mandatory. We add to the existing literature by investigating the auditing of small private firms and using more detailed measures for bank monitoring. Our results suggest a positive association between tax aggressiveness and audit quality, implying that auditors play a greater role in providing tax‐related planning services than restraining tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, bank monitoring is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. This is consistent with lending banks being more interested in cash savings than reducing tax aggressiveness. Finally, we find no evidence of a joint effect of auditing and bank relationships. These results will interest the owners and managers of private companies, tax authorities and banks and the accounting and auditing profession.

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