Governments everywhere faced daunting and often unprecedented challenges in the face of the first peak of the COVD-19 pandemic. Public leaders sought to regain control over a highly uncertain and dynamic threat, formulating strategies that were implemented at considerable economic, societal and political costs. Normal modes of policymaking had to be abandoned, as conventional toolkits and contingency plans proved ineffective. In this paper, we offer a first inventory of possible lessons that we draw from our study of crisis responses in various European political systems. Our aim is to formulate an agenda for learning lessons from the management of the largest crisis to hit the world in years. These lessons should help policymakers prepare for future crises, which appear inevitable.

On the last day of 2019, China alerted the World Health Organization to a cluster of mysterious pneumonia cases. A new coronavirus (Covid-19) was discovered. Within three months after the alert, Europe had become the epicenter of a global pandemic. Even though the virus spread easily and quickly within communities, it took its time to travel from China to northern Europe. Nevertheless, many governments were slow to respond to the emerging threat. This chapter analyzes the initial phase of the Covid-19 crisis in Sweden and the Netherlands, focusing on the relationship between experts and decision-makers. The chapter discusses four factors that may help explain why the Swedish and Dutch governments were slow in their response. The governments assumed an epidemic like the one in China would not happen in their country, the experts followed international scientific guidelines, citizens were expected to defy limitations on their freedoms, and both experts and decision-makers were confident with regard to the level of preparedness. Lessons are formulated for further analysis and future preparations.