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Social and metacognitive contributors to gender differences in 1st grader's mathematics strategy use were explored. Fifty-eight children solved addition and subtraction problems individually and in groups of 3 in October, January, and May. The children's strategy use was assessed individually, as well as their metacognitive knowledge for mathematics strategies and their rationales for the use of different mathematics strategies. The children also solved addition and subtraction problems in groups. Gender differences were found: Girls were more likely to count on fingers or use counters (overt strategies); boys were more likely to use retrieval (from memory) to solve addition and subtraction problems. All children were less likely to use overt strategies and more likely to use covert strategies and retrieval in the group session. Metacognition was a significant predictor of strategy use. Social rationales for strategy use emerged at the end of the year.Although few studies have found gender differences in elementary school mathematics (e.g., Fennema, 1974;Hyde, Fennema & Lamon, 1990), gender differences have emerged when specific skills and tasks were examined. For example, preschool girls have a better understanding of number and geometry (Rea & Reys, 1970) and girls are also better at categorizing items (Lowery & Allan, 1970). In the later elementary school years, girls are better at calculation and boys are better at problem solving (Marshall, 1984). In addition, girls make different errors than boys in their problem solving as a function of the ways in which they solve problems (Marshall & Smith, 1987). These studies hint at the possibility that girls and boys possess different mathematics skills and knowledge.Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, and Anderson (1995) proposed that children's domain-specific knowledge is acquired and organized using theories that children have about that domain. The development of these theories is believed to be dependent on children's ability to reflect on thencognitive processes and states. Thus, according to Kuhn et al.'s perspective, children's developing understanding of mathematics should be tied to reflective, metacognitive knowledge about mathematics. There is evidence that metacognitive knowledge is related to good performance in mathematics. We know that teaching children to use elaborative, integrative, or specific strategies and related metacognitive knowledge will result in improved mathematics achievement and retention (Charles & Lester, 1984;Swing & Peterson, 1988). In the case of mathematics strategies,

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Learning-disabled students received instructions about both summarization strategies and their personal beliefs about causality that were designed to improve reading comprehension. A sample of 75 upper elementary school students were assigned to four treatment groups. The main experimental condition received attributional retraining on paired-associate and sort-recall tasks (which were unrelated to the target comprehension tests), instructions on the use of a summarization strategy, attributional statements about the efficacy of the instructed strategy, and posttests by which we assessed reading skills and general attributional beliefs. Students in another experimental condition received an identical treatment package without prior attributional retraining on unrelated paired-associate and sort-recall tasks but with attributional statements embedded in the summarization strategy. Subjects in one control condition received strategy training (without attributional retraining), whereas those in the other received neither strategy nor attribution instructions. Results suggested that attributional training enhanced the maintenance of the summarization strategy and selectivity facilitated generalization. Domain-specific attributional beliefs seemed to provide important orientating and perseverating characteristics that enhanced goal-directed, strategic processing in learning-impaired students. In spite of performance improvements, however, long-standing, antecedent attributional beliefs were unaltered by program-specific attributional training.