By imposing a market like governance and directing entrepreneurs towards professional management, debt, and especially business debt, can serve as a reliable signal for outside equity investors. Such signals of firm accountability can alleviate the stringent information asymmetry at the early stages of the firm, and become stronger for bank business debt, in the presence of personal debt, and in high capital industries. Using the Kauffman Firm Survey, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses. Outside investors can rely on the governance role of debt and its underpinnings such as the bank-firm relationship. We also corroborate that young firms tend to focus on growth rather than profitability.

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We examine the relation between a measure of managers’ physical display—body expansiveness—and favorable reporting practices (in firm forecasts and valuation information) and performance (survival and funding success). We videotape 154 entrepreneurs pitching their business ideas, and use computer vision software to obtain information about speakers’ movements. We show that physical expansiveness correlates with higher forecast errors and proposed firm valuations and lower survival rates yet higher likelihood of funding success. We argue that investors may incorrectly interpret nonverbal communication in their assessments of entrepreneurs and propose a behavioral explanation. We further corroborate the proposed mechanism by studying investor perceptions of entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics. Overall, we shed light on an overlooked source of information—nonverbal behavior—and relate it to firm forecasting, valuation, survival, and financing success, which are important factors in the assessment of investment opportunities, deal structure, and monitoring.

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