Hospitality is a self-contradictory concept. Both inclusionary and exclusionary forces are present at the very threshold of hospitality. This article shows how this contradiction works in the practice of migration law. The author takes a Dutch case, the case of Abdirizaq Salah Sheekh, to reveal the force of this contradiction from the moment the asylum seeker arrives on the territory, all the way through to the end of his story at the European Court of Human Rights. The case is, in fact, a symptomatic indictment of how aliens are treated in the Netherlands and, in a more general sense, in Europe as a whole. This article not only demonstrates how the question of hospitality commences with language − the moment we start communicating with the alien − the author also argues that in the violent collision produced by the the two contradictory demands of hospitality, a new subject is created. Not only is the migration procedure questioned, but also the subject of migration law.

In the period 2014–2019, the Dutch authorities governed the duration of asylum procedures in order to control the influx of asylum seekers. They prioritised and accelerated cases with poor chances of success, while they deprioritised cases with good chances of success. This resulted in long asylum procedures for asylum seekers with a likelihood of success and short asylum procedures for those with a poor chance of success. This article contends that this Dutch policy is an illustration of ‘temporal governance’: a governmental strategy to control and discipline migrants by means of time. This form of governance is based on a detailed knowledge of processes of asylum procedures, which enables qualification, categorisation and differentiation between different groups of asylum seekers. The focus of this research is on how such temporal governance functions and how it relates to law. A traditional understanding of law and sovereign power entails that law legitimates and restricts power. Strikingly, temporal governance regulating the asylum procedure seems to have a different relationship to law. This article demonstrates that legal standards, in this case the standards of European Union legislation, provide Member States a large amount of room (temporal discretion) to apply temporal governance. Moreover, only a few limited legal remedies remain available, if the duration of the asylum procedure appears unlawful. Instead of limiting temporal governance, law provides ample opportunity for the acceleration and deceleration of asylum cases in order to delay due process of asylum seekers and deter others from arriving. We cannot prove that the Dutch government aimed at deprioritising and decelerating complex asylum cases and cases with good chances of success – which would have been unlawful. However, this was the net result of their chosen policy. We illustrate that instead of a legitimation and restriction of sovereign power to govern the asylum influx by means of time, law can function as a set of tactics to pursue policy aims by employing ‘temporal governance’.

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Time is one of the most important means for the exercise of power. In Migration Law, it is used for disciplining and controlling the presence of migrants within a certain territory through the intricate interplay of two overlapping but contradicting understandings of time – human and clock time. This book explores both the success and limitations of the usage of time for the governance of migration. The virtues of legal time can be seen at work in several temporal differentiations in migration law: differentiation based on temporality, deadlines, qualification of time and procedural differentiation. Martijn Stronks contests that, hidden in the usage of legal time in Migration Law, there is an argument for the inclusion of migrants on the basis of their right to human time. This assertion is based in the finite, irreversible and unstoppable character of human time.

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