It is a common narrative that blockchains are immutable and so it is technically impossible to erase data stored on them. For legal and ethical reasons, however, individuals and organizations might be compelled to erase locally stored data, be it encoded on a blockchain or not. The common assumption for blockchain networks like Bitcoin is that forcing nodes to erase data contained on the blockchain is equal to permanently restricting them from participating in the system in a full-node role. Challenging this belief, in this paper, we propose and demonstrate a pragmatic approach towards functionality-preserving local erasure (FPLE). FPLE enables full nodes to erase infringing or undesirable data while continuing to store and validate most of the blockchain. We describe a general FPLE approach for UTXO-based (i. e., Bitcoin-like) cryptocurrencies and present a lightweight proof-of-concept tool for safely erasing transaction data from the local storage of Bitcoin Core nodes. Erasing nodes continue to operate in tune with the network even when erased transaction outputs become relevant for validating subsequent blocks. Using only our basic proof-of-concept implementation, we are already able to safely comply with a significantly larger range of erasure requests than, to the best of our knowledge, any other full node operator so far.

Ethereum is a decentralized Blockchain system that supports the execution of Turing-complete smart contracts. Although the security of the Ethereum ecosystem has been studied in the past, the network layer has been mostly neglected. We show that Go Ethereum (Geth), the most widely used Ethereum implementation, is vulnerable to eclipse attacks, effectively circumventing recently introduced security enhancements. 1 . Our false friends attack exploits the Kademlia-inspired peer discovery logic used by Geth and enables a low-resource eclipsing of longrunning, remote victim nodes. An adversary only needs two hosts in distinct /24 subnets to launch the eclipse, which can then be leveraged to filter the victim's view of the Blockchain. We discuss fundamental properties of Geth's node discovery logic that enable the false friends attack, as well as proposed and implemented countermeasures.

The price volatility of cryptocurrencies is often cited as a major hindrance to their wide-scale adoption. Consequently, during the last two years, multiple so called stablecoins have surfaced-cryptocurrencies focused on maintaining stable exchange rates. In this paper, we systematically explore and analyze the stablecoin landscape. Based on a survey of 24 specific stablecoin projects, we go beyond individual coins for extracting general concepts and approaches. We combine our findings with learnings from classical monetary policy, resulting in a comprehensive taxonomy of cryptocurrency stabilization. We use our taxonomy to highlight the current state of development from different perspectives and show blank spots. For instance, while over 91% of projects promote 1-to-1 stabilization targets to external assets, monetary policy literature suggests that the smoothing of short term volatility is often a more sustainable alternative. Our taxonomy bridges computer science and economics, fostering the transfer of expertise. For example, we find that 38% of the reviewed projects use a combination of exchange rate targeting and specific stabilization techniques that can render them vulnerable to speculative economic attacks-an avoidable design flaw.