\asan \anafÊ is often described as leading and original reformer of Arab thought, renovator of the Islamic cultural heritage (tur §th) and advocate of political freedom. But these categorizations are based on insufficient analyses of his writings on both the Islamic and the Western intellectual heritage as well as his statements on current political issues. A critical reading of the first unveils that \anafÊ misrepresents religious and philosophical doctrines and that he systematically passes over the fact that the relations between intellectual currents which he claims as role models for the "Islamic left" were marked by deep enmity. His writings on Marxism reveal that he merely condemns capitalism on moral terms without deeper analysis of the way it works. He himself proposes the idea of historical cycles determining the course of Eastern and Western civilization. This allows him to predict the imminent decline of the latter. The contradicting elements in \anafÊ's thought do, however, gain coherence when analyzed in the context of his writings on the modern history of Egypt and the Middle East at large. Here he juxtaposes activist and progressive Nasserism to the religious quietism used by Sadat to legitimize his 1 This article is based on an M.A. thesis at the "Orientalisches Seminar" of the Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen in 1996. A note on reference to \anafÊ's writings: In the following, lower case Roman ciphers (i, v, x etc.) refer to the volumes of Al-DÊn wa-l-Thawra fÊ Mißr 1952Mißr -1981 those in upper case (I, V, X etc.) indicate the volumes of Min al-'AqÊda il § l-Thawra. See also the list of his writings at the end of this article. 2 "Notes on Nationalism" quoted after Collected Works vol. xvii "I belong to the left-1945", London 1998, p. 154. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007Die Welt des Islams 47, 1 Also available online -www.brill.nl

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India’s and Pakistan’s governments, like most of the world’s governments, responded to the spread of the COVID-19 virus with lockdowns, which in principle also affected religious institutions and rituals. However, Sunni mosques in Pakistan were not closed, as the government has no authority over autonomous religious organizations. In contrast, the Islamic organizations and institutions in India complied with government orders, and tried to present themselves as a “responsible minority” during a period when relations with the Hindu nationalist government were strained, and because a convention of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat had contributed considerably to the spread of the disease in the country and abroad. In Pakistan, the role of the “responsible minority” was played by the Shiites, who closed their mosques. On the whole, Muslim religious leaders and organizations showed little interest in taking a stand on the pandemic. Those few who make extensive use of the internet tend to address the better-educated social strata, and tend view pandemic-related restrictions more favorably.

Of all scientific theories the theory of evolution arguably poses the greatest challenge to theistic religions because it threatens to undermine teleology and the central position of mankind in nature. Nevertheless, modernist thinkers among South Asian Muslims like Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Abū l-Kalām Āzād strove to demonstrate its compatibility with the Qur’ān. Their efforts were rejected by Islamists like Mawdūdī and more traditional scholars writing on the subject. They defended the concept of a consciously designed universe instead. That the defence of this idea is the main motivation for resentment against the theory of evolution among Muslims is underscored by the fact the even a thinker like Ghulām Aḥmad Parwez, who readily dismissed central concepts of traditional theology, accepted the concept of evolution only without the principle of natural selection. Although negative assessments prevail, the theory of evolution did not foment a campaign among South Asian Muslims as it did in Turkey. This is most likely due to the lack of awareness among many ‘ulamā’ and the fact that the theory of evolution was not ideologically appropriated by adversaries of Islamic groups.

Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhäb (1703-1792, the founder of the puritan Wahhäbi movement in Islam, has vmtten a biography of the prophet that differs markedly from other later works of this genre. He passes over many episodes that are supposed to elevate the status of Muhammad beyond that of an ordinary human, whereas he includes episodes that show him as human, or even fallible, such as the controversial "Satanic verses." The purpose of this selection is to demonstrate that apart from events specifically related to revelation, Muhammad was a human being whose actions can be imitated. However, the scope of Muhammad's actions is reduced to the eradication of unbelief and idolatry. This is supposed to suggest that Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhäb himself is completing what Muhammad has begun and to legitimize the warfare of followers against the "idolaters." Keywords Muhammad (the prophet), veneration of Muhammad; Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhäb, Wahhabism, sïra literature, prophets (in Islam)Given some commonplace notions about Islam it might seem nonsensical to address an Islamic subject within the context of "the Gods as role models": since everything created is incomparable to God, the creator, he can obviously not serve as a role model for humans. Instead, the role model Muslims should emulate -either directly as males or as females via the commands he gave to his wives and daughters -is