The European Green Deal (EGD) is an ambitious strategy. However, significant events, incidents, and demands, from democratic backsliding in the EU to the Covid-19 pandemic, are causing the ground to shift underfoot. These events go beyond ordinary changes or even individual crises, cumulatively fuelling a “new normal” of turbulence for the EU, encompassing rapid, unpredictable changes. This turbulence can help and hinder policy design and implementation, requiring policy actors to think outside the box and beyond the status quo. This article investigates how the European Commission and other key actors can engage effectively <em>with</em> turbulence to ensure the successful delivery and implementation of the EGD. The first half of the article strengthens and adapts turbulent governance literature (Ansell &amp; Trondal, 2018). It delineates how turbulence differs from crisis; expands the forms of turbulence to include horizontal scalar and policy turbulence, as well as its transversal attribute; and shifts the focus to governing <em>with</em> turbulence rather than against<em> </em>turbulence. The second half undertakes an initial analysis of the EGD in light of turbulence and provides a springboard for further investigations within this thematic issue and beyond. It is apparent that the EGD is both responding and contributing to a varied landscape of turbulence. Policy actors must identify and understand the sources of turbulence—including their transversal nature and the potential for responses to increase turbulence—if they are to effectively govern <em>with</em> turbulence.

The world is currently facing the worst pandemic in a century and we were caught unprepared. COVID-19 has proven highly contagious and with severe consequences that are still unfolding. As of 16 April 2020, there were over 2 million confirmed cases and over 136,000 related deaths reported worldwide.1 Over 1 million of those confirmed cases were in the preceding 14 days, with the USA accounting for nearly half of those. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is now warning that the world is about to suffer the worst economic recession since the Great Depression in the 1920s.2

The cultivation of genetically modified (GM) crops in the EU is highly harmonised, but with persisting conflicts over authority. The Commission responded to internal and external pressures with a more flexible approach to coexistence, a proposed optout clause and a promise to review the existing EU GM regime, providing an opportunity to consider and suggest paths of development. This article considers the post-authorisation policy-making powers of Member States and subnational regions, in light of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance. It considers the different approaches to risk-centred issues and more general policy choices. Overall, the developments occurring at the EU level are strengthening subsidiarity-based multilevel governance within the GM cultivation regime, but with significant opportunities to improve it further through focussing on the complementary powers, coordination and the regional levels in particular.

In a pluralistic society, agreement over complex issues is frequently difficult to achieve. This is amply demonstrated by the question of cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), where scientific uncertainty relating to potential threats to the environment or human health runs parallel with concerns over ethics, freedom of choice, and competing agricultural and economic interests. Conflict centres over the objective of free trade of GMOs and the circumstances in which restrictions may legitimately be imposed to deal with the abovementioned concerns, in particular regarding cultivation.

In the midst of the European Union (EU) genetically modified organisms (GMOs) regime, coexistence of GM and non‐GM crops alongside each other remains technically within the competence of the Member States. Post EU authorization of a GM crop, Member States may legally take appropriate measures to limit or prevent the presence of GMOs within non‐GM crops. In July 2010, as part of a Cultivation Package, the Commission created a new Coexistence Recommendation that supports a flexible approach to more stringent coexistence measures by the States, while attempting to maintain control over the legitimate objectives justifying the measures. This article analyzes the impact of the 2010 Recommendation upon coexistence in the context of the existing practices and the previous 2003 Recommendation, taking into account its status as a soft law document and the ‘domino effect’. It is argued that the 2010 Recommendation may have greater practical and legal ramifications for coexistence than might first be thought. In attempting to create guidelines that allow a more flexible and inclusive approach towards national measures, the 2010 Recommendation may act as a catalyst to eventually exclude GM cultivation within Member States.